#ifndef SECP256K1_FROST_ENROLLMENT_H
#define SECP256K1_FROST_ENROLLMENT_H

#include "secp256k1.h"
#include "secp256k1_frost.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif

#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>

/** This module implements FROST enrollment, the protocol of Section 4.1.1 of
 *  the FROST paper (https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1155.pdf). It converts a
 *  (t, n) FROST group into a (t, n+1) group without re-running key generation
 *  and without any participant revealing its secret share. The same mechanism
 *  repairs a lost share: running it with the target identifier of an existing
 *  participant reproduces exactly that participant's share.
 *
 *  This code is currently a work in progress. It's not secure nor stable.
 *  IT IS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND RECKLESS TO USE THIS MODULE IN PRODUCTION!
 *
 *  Unlike the frost module, this protocol has no BIP. It is specified only by
 *  the paper and by the reference proof of concept at
 *  https://github.com/siv2r/frost-enrollment. The tagged hash strings and the
 *  parameter serialization used here are this module's own, frozen by the
 *  regression vectors in src/modules/frost_enrollment/vectors.h.
 *
 *  Identifiers follow the frost module: participants are identified by uint32
 *  values 0..n-1, and participant id i sits at polynomial x-coordinate i+1.
 *  The party receiving a share is identified by `new_id`, which selects the
 *  mode:
 *
 *    - enrollment: new_id == n_participants. The group grows to n+1
 *      participants, so n_participants must be strictly smaller than
 *      SECP256K1_FROST_MAX_PARTICIPANTS.
 *    - repair: new_id < n_participants. The share of an existing participant
 *      is reproduced; n_participants may be SECP256K1_FROST_MAX_PARTICIPANTS.
 *
 *  In both modes new_id must not appear in the helper id set.
 *
 *  A run involves u helpers (threshold <= u <= n_participants), all of which
 *  must be existing participants, plus the target participant:
 *
 *    1. Round 1.1: every helper runs
 *       `secp256k1_frost_enrollment_shares_gen`, keeps the output share at
 *       its own position and sends each other output share, together with the
 *       returned parameters hash, to the helper it is aligned with.
 *    2. Round 1.2: every helper runs
 *       `secp256k1_frost_enrollment_share_agg` over the share it kept and the
 *       shares it received. The function recomputes the parameters hash and
 *       compares every received hash against it, then sums the shares into a
 *       single value that is sent to the target participant along with the
 *       hash.
 *    3. Round 2: the target participant runs
 *       `secp256k1_frost_enrollment_secshare_gen` over the u received values.
 *       It recomputes the parameters hash from the group key and parameters it
 *       believes, sums the values into its secret share, and verifies the
 *       result against the expected public share obtained from
 *       `secp256k1_frost_enrollment_pubshare_derive`.
 *
 *  Afterwards, in enrollment mode, all participants must consistently update
 *  their record of n from n to n+1, and extend their table of public shares
 *  with the output of `secp256k1_frost_enrollment_pubshare_derive`.
 *
 *  SECURITY: the values exchanged in rounds 1 and 2 are additive shares of
 *  real secret shares. They MUST be transmitted over confidential and
 *  authenticated channels. Like the chilldkg module, this module handles bytes
 *  only; transport is the caller's responsibility. Furthermore, the protocol
 *  contains no authorization step: any party that convinces t helpers to run
 *  it at a given identifier receives a valid share for that identifier. In
 *  repair mode that is an existing participant's actual share. Deciding who
 *  may be enrolled is a caller-side precondition.
 *
 *  It is recommended to read the documentation in this include file carefully.
 *  Further notes on API usage can be found in
 *  src/modules/frost_enrollment/frost_enrollment.md.
 */

/** Compute the enrollment parameters hash.
 *
 *  The hash is
 *
 *    out32 = tagged_hash("FROST enrollment/params_hash",
 *                        cbytes(thresh_pk) || ser32(n_participants) ||
 *                        ser32(threshold) || ser32(new_id) || ser32(n_ids) ||
 *                        ser32(sorted_ids[0]) || ... ||
 *                        ser32(sorted_ids[n_ids-1]))
 *
 *  where cbytes is the 33-byte compressed serialization, ser32 is the 32-bit
 *  big-endian encoding and sorted_ids is `ids` in ascending order. Sorting
 *  makes the hash independent of the order in which a caller lists the helper
 *  set; the alignment of every other array in this API follows the caller's
 *  own `ids` order.
 *
 *  Binding the threshold public key is what makes the hash identify a GROUP
 *  rather than a tuple of numbers: two unrelated groups that happen to share
 *  (t, n, ids, new_id) produce different hashes.
 *
 *  Every party computes this value itself. The hash checks performed by
 *  `secp256k1_frost_enrollment_share_agg` and
 *  `secp256k1_frost_enrollment_secshare_gen` compare a received hash against a
 *  freshly recomputed one; they are never an equality test between two
 *  caller-supplied strings.
 *
 *  This function operates on public data only.
 *
 *  This is also the natural place to pre-validate a parameter tuple: it
 *  enforces exactly the same constraints as the four functions below, and
 *  nothing else. Note that an unusable `thresh_pk` object is API MISUSE, not
 *  an invalid parameter: like every other entry point in the library, this
 *  function reports it through the illegal-argument callback rather than by
 *  returning 0.
 *
 *  Returns: 0 if the parameters are invalid, 1 otherwise
 *  Args:            ctx: pointer to a context object
 *  Out:           out32: pointer to a 32-byte array for the hash. Set to zero
 *                        if this function returns 0.
 *  In:        thresh_pk: pointer to the threshold public key of the group
 *                    ids: array of the u helper identifiers. Every id must be
 *                        unique, smaller than n_participants and different
 *                        from new_id; the order is irrelevant.
 *                 n_ids: number of helpers u. Must be between threshold and
 *                        n_participants.
 *                new_id: identifier of the participant receiving the share.
 *                        Must equal n_participants (enrollment) or be smaller
 *                        than it (repair).
 *        n_participants: total number of participants n. Must be at most
 *                        SECP256K1_FROST_MAX_PARTICIPANTS, and strictly
 *                        smaller in enrollment mode.
 *             threshold: threshold t. Must be at least 2 (see
 *                        frost_enrollment.md) and at most n_participants.
 */
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_frost_enrollment_params_hash(
    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
    unsigned char *out32,
    const secp256k1_pubkey *thresh_pk,
    const uint32_t *ids,
    size_t n_ids,
    uint32_t new_id,
    size_t n_participants,
    uint32_t threshold
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);

/** Round 1.1: generate a helper's enrollment shares.
 *
 *  Computes v = lambda_my_id(x_new) * secshare, where lambda is the Lagrange
 *  basis polynomial of my_id over the helper set evaluated at the target
 *  x-coordinate, and splits v into u additive shares that sum to v.
 *
 *  `shares32_out` is aligned with `ids`: entry j is destined for the helper
 *  with identifier ids[j] and must be sent to it over a confidential,
 *  authenticated channel, together with `params_hash32_out`. The entry at
 *  my_id's own position is not sent anywhere; it is passed back into
 *  `secp256k1_frost_enrollment_share_agg` in round 1.2.
 *
 *  The masking shares are derived from `session_secrand32` by tagged hashing,
 *  masked with the secret share as defense in depth against a broken random
 *  number generator (as `secp256k1_frost_nonce_gen` does). The derivation
 *  binds the parameters hash, and therefore the group key and the whole
 *  parameter tuple, for DOMAIN SEPARATION: two runs that share a seed but
 *  differ in group or parameters must not produce the same shares, because
 *  differencing the round-1.2 outputs would then leak share information. This
 *  binding cannot detect a parameter disagreement between helpers — these
 *  values are per-helper private randomness that nothing cross-checks — which
 *  is what the parameters hash comparison in round 1.2 is for.
 *
 *  `session_secrand32` must be fresh uniformly random 32 bytes for every run.
 *  It is wiped before this function returns. `secshare32` is left unmodified.
 *
 *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid, 1 otherwise
 *  Args:            ctx: pointer to a context object
 *  Out:    shares32_out: pointer to an array of u*32 bytes for the enrollment
 *                        shares, aligned with `ids`. Not written at all when
 *                        the parameter tuple is rejected, since its extent is
 *                        only known to be u*32 once n_ids has been validated
 *                        against the rest of the tuple; zeroed on every
 *                        failure detected after that point.
 *      params_hash32_out: pointer to a 32-byte array for the parameters hash,
 *                        identical to what
 *                        `secp256k1_frost_enrollment_params_hash` returns for
 *                        the same arguments. Set to zero if this function
 *                        returns 0.
 *  In/Out:
 *      session_secrand32: pointer to a 32-byte array of fresh randomness. Must
 *                        not be reused across runs. Wiped by this function.
 *  In:        secshare32: pointer to the 32-byte secret share of my_id
 *              thresh_pk: pointer to the threshold public key of the group
 *                    ids: array of the u helper identifiers. Every id must be
 *                        unique, smaller than n_participants and different
 *                        from new_id; the order is irrelevant but fixes the
 *                        alignment of `shares32_out`.
 *                 n_ids: number of helpers u. Must be between threshold and
 *                        n_participants.
 *                 my_id: own identifier. Must appear in `ids`.
 *                new_id: identifier of the participant receiving the share.
 *                        Must equal n_participants (enrollment) or be smaller
 *                        than it (repair).
 *        n_participants: total number of participants n. Must be at most
 *                        SECP256K1_FROST_MAX_PARTICIPANTS, and strictly
 *                        smaller in enrollment mode.
 *             threshold: threshold t. Must be at least 2 (see
 *                        frost_enrollment.md) and at most n_participants.
 */
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_frost_enrollment_shares_gen(
    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
    unsigned char *shares32_out,
    unsigned char *params_hash32_out,
    unsigned char *session_secrand32,
    const unsigned char *secshare32,
    const secp256k1_pubkey *thresh_pk,
    const uint32_t *ids,
    size_t n_ids,
    uint32_t my_id,
    uint32_t new_id,
    size_t n_participants,
    uint32_t threshold
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(7);

/** Round 1.2: check parameter agreement and aggregate a helper's enrollment
 *  shares.
 *
 *  The function recomputes its own parameters hash from `thresh_pk` and the
 *  parameter tuple it is given, and compares every entry of
 *  `received_params_hashes32` against it. It then sums the shares.
 *
 *  `mismatch_id` reports fault attribution for BOTH ways a specific helper's
 *  contribution can be at fault:
 *
 *    - its parameters hash disagrees with the recomputed one, meaning that
 *      helper ran round 1.1 on a different parameter tuple or in a different
 *      group;
 *    - its entry in `all_shares32` is not a valid scalar (it is not smaller
 *      than the group order), meaning the value was corrupted in transit or
 *      fabricated.
 *
 *  In both cases the function returns 0 and, if `mismatch_id` is not NULL,
 *  stores the IDENTIFIER of the responsible helper there -- not an array
 *  index, which would be ambiguous because identifiers need not be 0..u-1.
 *  The two causes are not distinguished, so a caller should not report one of
 *  them specifically. Note that the second cause can name the CALLER'S OWN
 *  identifier, since the share kept locally is summed along with the rest.
 *
 *  `mismatch_id` is set to UINT32_MAX when the failure has neither cause,
 *  which covers every invalid-parameter and API-misuse case.
 *
 *  Note the deliberately OPPOSITE own-slot conventions of the two u*32 input
 *  buffers, both of which are aligned with `ids`:
 *
 *    - `all_shares32`: the entry at my_id's position IS read. It is the share
 *      `secp256k1_frost_enrollment_shares_gen` kept locally.
 *    - `received_params_hashes32`: the entry at my_id's position is NEVER
 *      read, and may be left zero. The own hash is recomputed, never taken
 *      from a buffer.
 *
 *  The asymmetry is the point: it is what makes this a recomputation check
 *  rather than an equality test among caller-supplied strings, so a caller
 *  cannot launder a mismatch into a pass by filling its own slot with a
 *  received value.
 *
 *  `sigma32_out` must be sent to the target participant over a confidential,
 *  authenticated channel, together with the parameters hash.
 *
 *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or a parameters hash disagrees,
 *           1 otherwise
 *  Args:            ctx: pointer to a context object
 *  Out:     sigma32_out: pointer to a 32-byte array for the aggregated share.
 *                        Set to zero if this function returns 0.
 *            mismatch_id: pointer to an identifier to store the first helper
 *                        whose parameters hash disagrees, or NULL
 *  In:      all_shares32: pointer to an array of u*32 bytes, aligned with
 *                        `ids`: the share kept locally at my_id's position and
 *                        the shares received from the other helpers at theirs
 *      received_params_hashes32: pointer to an array of u*32 bytes, aligned
 *                        with `ids`, holding the parameters hash received from
 *                        each other helper. The entry at my_id's position is
 *                        ignored.
 *              thresh_pk: pointer to the threshold public key of the group
 *                    ids: array of the u helper identifiers, in the same order
 *                        as in round 1.1
 *                 n_ids: number of helpers u
 *                 my_id: own identifier. Must appear in `ids`.
 *                new_id: identifier of the participant receiving the share
 *        n_participants: total number of participants n
 *             threshold: threshold t
 */
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_frost_enrollment_share_agg(
    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
    unsigned char *sigma32_out,
    uint32_t *mismatch_id,
    const unsigned char *all_shares32,
    const unsigned char *received_params_hashes32,
    const secp256k1_pubkey *thresh_pk,
    const uint32_t *ids,
    size_t n_ids,
    uint32_t my_id,
    uint32_t new_id,
    size_t n_participants,
    uint32_t threshold
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(7);

/** Derive the public share at the target identifier.
 *
 *  Computes sum_i lambda_i(x_new) * pubshares[i], the value of the group's
 *  public-share polynomial at the target participant's x-coordinate. This is
 *  the public counterpart of what the protocol produces, and it is used both
 *  to verify the new secret share in round 2 and to extend the group's table
 *  of public shares from n to n+1 entries after an enrollment.
 *
 *  This function operates on public data only.
 *
 *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the result is the point at
 *           infinity, 1 otherwise
 *  Args:            ctx: pointer to a context object
 *  Out: new_pubshare_out: pointer to a pubkey object for the derived public
 *                        share. Set to zero if this function returns 0.
 *  In:        pubshares: array of u pubkeys, aligned with `ids`, holding the
 *                        public share of each helper
 *                    ids: array of the u helper identifiers
 *                 n_ids: number of helpers u
 *                new_id: identifier of the participant receiving the share
 *        n_participants: total number of participants n
 *             threshold: threshold t
 */
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_frost_enrollment_pubshare_derive(
    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
    secp256k1_pubkey *new_pubshare_out,
    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubshares,
    const uint32_t *ids,
    size_t n_ids,
    uint32_t new_id,
    size_t n_participants,
    uint32_t threshold
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);

/** Round 2: derive the target participant's secret share.
 *
 *  In order:
 *
 *    1. If `expected_params_hash32` is not NULL, the parameters hash is
 *       recomputed from `thresh_pk` and the parameter tuple the target
 *       participant believes, and compared against it. The round-1.2 check
 *       covers helper against helper only; without this check, all helpers
 *       could agree on parameters that differ from the ones the target
 *       expects, or belong to a different group entirely, and the discrepancy
 *       would surface only as an unexplained failure of the public-share
 *       check.
 *    2. The u values are summed into `secshare32_out`.
 *    3. If `expected_pubshare` is not NULL, secshare*G is compared against it.
 *
 *  `expected_pubshare` is load-bearing: it is the only check that a helper
 *  contributed a correct value. Pass NULL only if the resulting share is
 *  validated by other means.
 *
 *  PRECONDITION, documented but not enforced: `thresh_pk` must come from a
 *  source the target participant authenticates independently of the helpers,
 *  and `expected_pubshare` must be derived from public shares validated
 *  against it with `secp256k1_frost_threshold_info_validate`. Otherwise both
 *  checks are circular: t colluding helpers can present a consistent but
 *  fabricated polynomial, and every check in this function passes on a
 *  worthless share. See frost_enrollment.md and examples/frost_enrollment.c.
 *
 *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or a check fails, 1 otherwise
 *  Args:            ctx: pointer to a context object
 *  Out:  secshare32_out: pointer to a 32-byte array for the secret share. Set
 *                        to zero if this function returns 0.
 *  In:         sigmas32: pointer to an array of u*32 bytes, aligned with
 *                        `ids`, holding the value received from each helper
 *              thresh_pk: pointer to the INDEPENDENTLY AUTHENTICATED threshold
 *                        public key of the group
 *                    ids: array of the u helper identifiers, in the same order
 *                        as `sigmas32`
 *                 n_ids: number of helpers u
 *                new_id: own identifier, the one the share is being derived
 *                        for
 *        n_participants: total number of participants n
 *             threshold: threshold t
 *   expected_params_hash32: pointer to the 32-byte parameters hash received
 *                        from the helpers, or NULL to skip the comparison
 *      expected_pubshare: pointer to the expected public share, from
 *                        `secp256k1_frost_enrollment_pubshare_derive`, or NULL
 *                        to skip the verification (not recommended). When it
 *                        is non-NULL, ctx must have been initialized for
 *                        signing; when it is NULL, no context capability
 *                        beyond the default is required.
 */
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_frost_enrollment_secshare_gen(
    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
    unsigned char *secshare32_out,
    const unsigned char *sigmas32,
    const secp256k1_pubkey *thresh_pk,
    const uint32_t *ids,
    size_t n_ids,
    uint32_t new_id,
    size_t n_participants,
    uint32_t threshold,
    const unsigned char *expected_params_hash32,
    const secp256k1_pubkey *expected_pubshare
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5);

#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

#endif /* SECP256K1_FROST_ENROLLMENT_H */