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Author SHA1 Message Date
Tim Ruffing 41f8993a4b Clarify nonce generation 
- Separate nonce generation into getting a random byte string and converting it to a suitable scalar ...
 - ... to make clear that the byte string can be generated differently.
 - Make the warning a little bit more prominent and improve writing
 2020-01-19 14:47:33 -08:00
Tim Ruffing 0dd7489dfd Update bip-schnorr.mediawiki 2020-01-19 14:47:33 -08:00
Tim Ruffing 3cc2d8ed6d Mention that we don't change the hash function 2020-01-19 14:47:33 -08:00
Tim Ruffing ad6bb6c1ff Clarify why we don't want short hashes 
This is supposed to supersede https://github.com/sipa/bips/pull/158.
I tried to say this carefully. I don't think that multiparty signing is in general broken with short hashes. For example the attack in #158 could be avoided by letting everybody not only commit to the nonce but also to the message. It's just that using a collision-resistant hash just eliminates the problem entirely...
 2020-01-19 14:47:33 -08:00
Tim Ruffing 9b5ba158c1 improve rationale for key prefixing 2020-01-19 14:47:33 -08:00
Tim Ruffing 7c00346cf2 typos 2020-01-19 14:47:33 -08:00
Tim Ruffing 09e3f637b5 Change reference for ECDSA proofs 
Refer to Manuel Fersch's dissertation for provable security of ECDSA. It's freely accessible and multiple results put well in context.
 2020-01-19 14:47:33 -08:00
Tim Ruffing a7ee6c30fa bip-schnorr: more on (e,s) 2020-01-19 14:47:33 -08:00
Tim Ruffing bc4e8f28b8 bip-schnorr: more on provable security 
I'll try to get a link to the CCS paper that does not have a paywall...
 2020-01-19 14:47:33 -08:00
Tim Ruffing e0e422a5ca Link to Schnorr's paper instead of Wikipedia 2020-01-19 14:47:33 -08:00
Tim Ruffing 2b987b5711 Rework Applications section 2020-01-19 14:47:33 -08:00
Tim Ruffing 29037bd123 Add a footnote about 32-byte security 2020-01-19 14:47:33 -08:00
Tim Ruffing 63a19990fd Clarify nonce generation 
- Separate nonce generation into getting a random byte string and converting it to a suitable scalar ...
 - ... to make clear that the byte string can be generated differently.
 - Make the warning a little bit more prominent and improve writing
 2020-01-03 12:36:25 +01:00
Tim Ruffing ad1eba008c Update bip-schnorr.mediawiki 2019-12-14 22:11:47 +01:00
Tim Ruffing ff2b53737c Mention that we don't change the hash function 2019-12-13 12:11:50 +01:00
Tim Ruffing 92582c2a33 Clarify why we don't want short hashes 
This is supposed to supersede https://github.com/sipa/bips/pull/158.
I tried to say this carefully. I don't think that multiparty signing is in general broken with short hashes. For example the attack in #158 could be avoided by letting everybody not only commit to the nonce but also to the message. It's just that using a collision-resistant hash just eliminates the problem entirely...
 2019-12-12 22:49:21 +01:00
Tim Ruffing db1973ffba improve rationale for key prefixing 2019-10-30 01:32:07 +01:00
Tim Ruffing 73b8e3aeeb typos 2019-10-30 01:27:26 +01:00
Tim Ruffing 0176ed1871 Change reference for ECDSA proofs 
Refer to Manuel Fersch's dissertation for provable security of ECDSA. It's freely accessible and multiple results put well in context.
 2019-10-21 13:27:59 +02:00
Tim Ruffing 2d9877e6e1 bip-schnorr: more on (e,s) 2019-10-15 17:26:45 -07:00
Tim Ruffing e139975eff bip-schnorr: more on provable security 
I'll try to get a link to the CCS paper that does not have a paywall...
 2019-10-15 16:02:09 -07:00
Tim Ruffing 3f61b2b1e7 Link to Schnorr's paper instead of Wikipedia 2019-10-03 11:21:24 +02:00
Tim Ruffing 4a383064fb Add a footnote about 32-byte security 2019-09-08 16:38:55 +02:00
Tim Ruffing 6d99e45126 Rework Applications section 2019-09-08 16:38:15 +02:00