395bfa6b8b1c8b4516a540b975e01c2d70ca0c4f
810 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Kgothatso Ngako
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395bfa6b8b |
feat(subgroups): say which group the parent is, not only which id
The parent card on a room's detail screen read "Parent group" over sixteen hex characters. Every other card naming a room names it -- `SubgroupCard` has shown `room?.chatRoom?.subject` since subgroups landed -- and the one card pointing the other way up the lineage did not, although the room it points at is usually right there in the database. So: "Parent group" moves to the overline, the group's name becomes the headline, and the truncated id moves underneath, where it can still be read against what the lineage says. The label keeps its place rather than being replaced, because a card carrying a name and nothing else says nothing about which way the lineage runs, and the signing key's card -- same icon column, same shape -- sits directly above this one. **The name can only come from the room, and there is not always one.** A birth certificate names the child and never the certifier, so a member of the subgroup who is not also in the group above holds a verified lineage with nothing to call it by. That case keeps the card it already had: the id as the headline, no supporting line. It is not a corner -- it is the ordinary position of anyone welcomed into a subgroup rather than founding one -- so the room is a nullable field rather than something to wait for. `SubgroupManager.parentGroupsOf` is `parentsOf` with each id looked up, returning `Parent(chatRoomId, room)` the way `subgroupsOf` returns `Subgroup`. The verified set and its canonical order are untouched; a parent whose room is missing stays in the list. The id-only `parentsOf` stays as it is, because `offersTo` compares ids and should not pay for rooms it will not read. Three tests: a parent this device is in is named by its room, one it is not in is still listed with nothing to name it, and two parents keep the lineage's own order -- asserted against `parentsOf` rather than a written-out order, since canonical means sorted by id and nobody should have to know how two derived ids sort. 459 common tests, 985 jvm tests, `m3Audit` meets every budget. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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1a6034dadb | Merge branch 'mantra' into claude/subgroups-multiple-parents-053be4 | ||
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Kgothatso Ngako
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9be3e01d8b |
fix(subgroups): hand an adoption's outcome back on the main thread
"Add a parent group", then tapping any group, crashed outright:
IllegalStateException: Method setCurrentState must be called on the main thread
at androidx.lifecycle.LifecycleRegistry.enforceMainThreadIfNeeded
...
at NavController.popBackStack
at SelectAdoptingGroupScreen.kt:153
at SelectAdoptingGroupViewModel$offerTo$1.invokeSuspend
`offerTo` does its work in `viewModelScope.launch(Dispatchers.IO)` and called
`onDone` from inside it. The screen's callback called `onNavigateBack()` straight
through, which is `navController.popBackStack()` -- and navigation moves a back stack
entry's lifecycle, which is main-thread-only. Nothing in the chain switched.
**The dispatcher is the view model's business, not every caller's**, which is the
shape the app already uses in a dozen places and in both of the files this one was
modelled on: `SelectSubgroupAdminsViewModel.confirm` wraps its navigation in
`withContext(Dispatchers.Main)` and `AddArtifactViewModel` launches its `onSuccess`
there. A `finish` helper does it here, with the crash written above it so the next
person to add a callback to this class sees why. `ChatRoomDetailViewModel.acceptParent`
gets the same treatment: its only caller shows a snackbar, which happens to be
main-safe already, but a callback contract that is "safe if you are careful" is the
same bug waiting for a second caller.
**And the screen no longer navigates away on success**, which fixes a second thing
found on the way to the first. The snackbar was launched in
`rememberCoroutineScope()` -- this screen's own -- and then the screen popped, so the
message was racing its own scope's cancellation; `rememberNotifier` exists for exactly
that hazard and was not being used. Staying put is the better answer anyway, because
the list is the confirmation: the row just asked leaves it, since a certificate now
stands for the pair and `refuseAdoption` says so. The way out is the back button, which
a pushed screen has to have regardless. `offerTo` reloads before handing back so that
is true by the time the message appears.
The outer `scope.launch` around `offerTo` goes too -- it never suspended, and wrapping
a main-thread call in a launch was part of what made the threading hard to see.
No test covers this and none of the 1,416 would have. It is a dispatcher boundary
between a view model and a navigation callback, which is to say it lives in the one
layer this work had never run: compile-and-test verified, never driven through the app.
That was named as the risk when the feature landed, and this is it.
454 common tests, 962 jvm tests, `m3Audit` meets every budget.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kgothatso Ngako
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b6c3e3ddc0 |
test(subgroups): pin what addresses is worth, and when one ceremony is the whole question
Two surfaces the last three commits added and left resting on indirect coverage. Both are decisions rather than plumbing, and neither had a test that would notice it changing. **`SubgroupBirthCertificateEvent.addresses` had none at all.** Its sibling `certifies` has nineteen, several of them real FROST forgeries, because a certificate is the whole of what a subgroup relationship is. `addresses` was then added *beside* it as a deliberately weaker reading -- no derivation, no signature -- and exercised only through a view model, which is the wrong place to learn what it is worth. The invariant worth having is the one a future reader can get wrong: **an event can pass `addresses` and fail `certifies`.** Two cases say so in the two ways it happens -- an unsigned proposal, which is exactly what the ceremony screen holds and asks about, and a forgery authored and signed by the child's own quorum, which is anybody at all. A third asserts `certifies` implies `addresses`, so the weaker one cannot drift into being the stricter one while both are called "which child is this about". The other two are the case the predicate exists for: two subgroups of one parent. A sibling's well-formed proposal is not addressed to this child, *and is* addressed to the sibling -- told apart rather than both refused, which a predicate that merely failed closed would also satisfy. Checked by giving `addresses` a signature check: the two "and certifies nothing" cases fail, the other three do not. **`hidesOtherCeremonies` had none either**, and it decides where a tap in the transcript goes. `CeremonyQueueRoutingJvmTest` pins both of its guards separately, which is the point of four cases rather than two: - one ceremony owed -> open it. Drop the `size > 1` and this fails. - two owed -> the list, from either tap, because neither is the whole of what the room is waiting on this member for. - a *finished* ceremony's line -> open it, even while two others are owed. This is the restraint, and dropping the "is itself awaiting" clause is what it catches: a reader tapping history is asking to see history, not to be handed somebody else's queue. - an abandoned one is never owed, even when `pendingApproval` says it is. Each regression was reinstated separately and each is caught by exactly one case. One thing the empty expectation needed care over, and it is the same trap a test in `26d305bc` fell into: a watcher that writes once cannot be waited for by its own empty value, because empty is indistinguishable from not having run. The abandoned case waits on a clock instead and says so. **`hidesOtherDecisions`, the proposal counterpart this mirrors, still has no test.** It predates all of this and is left alone, but the asymmetry now runs the other way and is worth knowing about. **Still untested, and deliberately so rather than overlooked:** the three entry points into the ceremony list -- the "Key ceremonies" row on the group's details, which exists to be reachable in a *Marmot* room where "Shared key" is not, the standing notice handing back null for several, and the transcript line's routing. Those are desktop compose-ui tests over `ChatRoomDetailScreen` and `ChatTranscript`, both of which stand up considerably more than anything here does. 982 jvm tests, 459 common tests, `m3Audit` meeting every budget. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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26d305bc14 |
fix(subgroups): a parent's second subgroup can be certified, and sign its own key state
Both rungs after a subgroup's ceremony run in the **parent's** room. The birth certificate is the parent's signature, so it is signed where the parent's key is; the key state is signed over the parent's room because the room it is *about* does not exist yet -- that is the whole point of signing it first. So a parent making its second subgroup has two certificate signings and two key-state signings in one room, and the ceremony screen read them out by event kind alone. `observeSessionsForChatRoom` is `ORDER BY createdAt DESC`, so `firstOrNull` on a kind match is "the newest of that kind in this room" -- which is some other subgroup's. The screen for one child followed another child's progress. **The display was not the damage.** Both rungs disable their button while a signing of that kind is running and un-failed: ```kotlin enabled = … && (certificateSession == null || certificateFailed) ``` and a *completed* signing is un-failed forever. So once a parent had certified one subgroup, it could never be asked to certify another: the rung sat there disabled with no way out, and `proposeBirthCertificate` returned early on the same reading. The key state blocked the same way, and `createAdminGroup` is gated behind it, so the second subgroup could not be made at all. **It did not need two subgroups.** Adoption signs a key state in the child's own room (`proposeAcceptance`, `localChatRoom = childRoom`), so a group that has ever been adopted already holds a `GroupKeyStateEvent` session in its room -- enough to block the first subgroup it tries to make. What makes this a half-finished job rather than an oversight is that the *signed* facts were already right. `isCertified` goes through `observeBirthCertificate`, scoped by session id, and `isKeyStateSigned` through `observeSignedGroupKeyState`, whose own comment records this exact lesson being learned once already: "A ceremony room holds more than one ceremony the moment a subgroup's admins are the whole group." The in-flight lookups never got the same treatment, and the comment above the key-state watcher still asserted the premise that had stopped being true -- "the room a ceremony runs in signs nothing else". **The key state is matched on the ceremony the proposal names.** `GroupKeyStateEvent` carries `FrostKeyTag` from the moment the proposal is assembled, so `parseDkgSessionId(tags) == dkgSessionId` discriminates before the ceremony has a key and before anybody signs. The watcher moves out of `observeKeyState` -- deleted, with its `Job` -- and into `observeForCeremony`, which is already cancelled and re-pointed per ceremony and is where every other per-ceremony watcher lives. `observeForCeremony`'s null branch now clears `keyStateSession` too, which it could not before because the field was not its to clear. **The certificate is matched on the child it names, through a new `addresses`.** `certifies` could not be reused: it ends on `GroupKeyStateEvent.isSignedByRoom`, a real signature check by the parent's quorum, and the thing being matched here is a proposal that quorum has not signed yet -- that is what the rung is waiting for. `SubgroupBirthCertificateEvent.addresses` is the structural half (kind, content, the `d` tag, the parent tag), `certifies` now calls it so the two cannot drift, and its doc says outright that nothing may decide a lineage on it. The three values it reads come out of `assembleTags` together, so they agree by construction rather than by agreement. Correctness is not at stake in either: these two fields only decide which progress bar is drawn and which button is live. Whether the parent actually agreed is `isCertified`, which does check the signature. **`DkgRepository.roomDerivedBy(dkgSessionId)`** is the session-id-to-room derivation that `observeBirthCertificate` and `observeSignedGroupKeyState` each carried inline. Three callers now, one of them new, and the no-op repository answers null -- which is also the honest answer for a ceremony that has not finished, and the reason all three resolve it per emission rather than once. **Tests: `DkgRitualSecondSubgroupJvmTest`, 3 cases, each checked against the bug reinstated rather than only against the fix.** Two assert that the screen follows its own ceremony's signing when a sibling's is newer. The third is the permanent block, and it is driven in two emissions on a hot flow for a reason worth recording: written as a single emission it asserted "still null" and **passed against the bug**, because at that moment the watcher had not started. Nothing is proved by a field that is null before anybody has looked at it. **One test from the commit before this had to be rewritten, and the change is this commit's fault.** `DkgRitualStartOfferJvmTest`'s lost-update case forced its interleaving by parking the session watcher inside `pendingApproval` while the key-state watcher wrote. Those two are no longer concurrent -- the key-state watcher now starts *from* the session collector, after the park -- so the setup could not happen. The claim was untouched by that, so it is now made against the session watcher versus the room watcher, which are genuinely concurrent: both collect before either writes, neither waits on the other, and the field they contend over is `roomHasCeremony`, which is the one that decides whether the offer to start appears. Re-confirmed failing against the lost update reinstated. 973 jvm tests, 454 common tests, `m3Audit` meeting every budget. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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a14ea3d9d3 |
feat(dkg): every key ceremony a room holds, pending first
A room holds more than one ceremony as a matter of course, and has done since a subgroup's ChillDKG moved into its parent's Marmot room: the parent's own, long finished, plus one for every subgroup the group has ever made. Nothing in the app could name the second of them. `DkgRitualRoute` without a session id shows the room's *newest*, which is routinely the finished one with the subgroup's request buried underneath it. The group's details reached only that. The transcript could name one, by scrolling to the line it was about -- which for a subgroup means scrolling past whatever else the room has been used for, and is impossible for a ceremony whose line never arrived. **`DkgRitualListScreen`, deliberately the same shape as `ProposalListScreen`.** One row per ceremony off `observeSessionsForChatRoom`, split into "waiting for you" and "everything else". Split rather than sorted, for the reason `ProposalListUIState` gives: the rest of the list is what the room has done, these are what it is waiting on the reader for, and they are a different kind of thing to read. The finished ones are kept, because how this group came to hold the keys it holds is the other half of what the screen is for. **What "waiting on you" means is two things, and they are owed by different people.** An approval gate this member cannot delegate, and a finished ceremony whose room only its coordinator can create -- a ceremony reaching COMPLETE finishes nothing on its own, and nothing else in the app would tell the coordinator so. Both are asked of `DkgRepository` rather than re-derived, the same readings the transcript's standing notice and the ceremony screen make, so the three cannot disagree. An abandoned ceremony is asked neither: there is no step left to approve and no key to build a room from, and a row claiming otherwise would send a member to a screen with nothing on it. **A row says what the key is for before it says where it has got to**, because a room holding two holds them for different groups and a row that only reported progress would leave a member guessing which. A subgroup is named by its proposal, so there is a third branch for the member who arrives before that name has -- it still says which of the two kinds of key this is. The quorum is on the row too: a ceremony fixes it and it cannot be changed afterwards. **Three entry points, two of which were gaps.** `ChatRoomDetailScreen` gets a "Key ceremonies" row in *every* room, including the Marmot ones the `mlsGroupState` check keeps "Shared key" out of. The two are different questions and both are kept: "Shared key" offers a room a key of its own, which only a NIP-17 room can want; this lists the ceremonies a room *holds*. A parent's Marmot room has never had a door to its subgroups' ceremonies at all. The transcript's `CeremoniesAwaitingYouNotice` says "3 key ceremonies need you" and then opened `ceremonies.first()` -- answering a different question from the one it asked, and leaving the other two exactly as hard to find as before. It now opens the list whenever it stands for more than one, which is what the signing notice beside it already did. A ceremony line in the transcript routes to the list when it cannot name a session -- a line written before chat rows carried one -- or when the ceremony it names is not the only one waiting on this member. `hidesOtherCeremonies` mirrors `hidesOtherDecisions` exactly, including its restraint: only for a ceremony that is itself waiting on them, because a line about a finished one is history and a reader who taps it is asking to see that, not to be handed a queue. **An empty list offers the way out of itself**, rather than ending in a blank page that sends a member back to the group's details to find the other door. It only offers to ask; the ceremony screen still decides whether the group is in a position to hold one. `DkgRitualListViewModel` is a `MutableStateFlow` from the start rather than a `by mutableStateOf`, for the reason the commit before this one found. **Tests, 6 cases in 2 files.** `DkgRitualListViewModelJvmTest` covers the three decisions nothing else can check: that a ceremony wanting something is at the top even when its date is not, that only the coordinator is told to finish setting up a finished one, and that an abandoned ceremony is waiting on nobody even when both lookups say it is. `DkgRitualListScreenJvmTest` renders it and checks the thing that is only true once drawn -- that a row opens the ceremony it names rather than the room's newest, which is the whole reason the screen exists -- plus the two headings and the empty state's offer. **Not done.** Nobody has looked at this screen running; the render tests prove it composes, sections and routes, which is not the same thing. 970 jvm tests, 454 common tests, `m3Audit` meeting every budget. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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4e6ca0a080 |
fix(dkg): stop the key ceremony screen offering to start the ceremony it is showing
"Start key ceremony" is not a button, it is the whole no-ceremony screen -- the
explainer, the quorum picker and the FAB together -- so anything that leaves
`DkgRitualUIState.Loaded` saying there is no session puts that offer in front of a
member watching one run. Two unrelated things did, and they fail differently: one
flashes, one sticks.
**The state went up before the rows were read.** `initiate()` published a bare
`Loaded(localChatRoom)` -- session null, `roomHasCeremony` false -- and *then* started
the two flows that answer both questions. A cold open is the only time those queries
are slow, and it is exactly when a member arrives from the transcript's notice, so the
offer was drawn over a running ceremony for as long as they took. Both answers are a
row lookup, so they are now read with `first()` before anything is published and the
state goes up already correct. The flows still run; they only keep it current.
**Seven flows were folding into one `var ... by mutableStateOf`.** The ceremony, the
room's other ceremonies, the ceremony's messages, the key state, whether the key state
is signed, the certificate and the certificate's signing -- each of them a read, a
`copy` and an assignment, every one emitting on Room's own executor. Two emissions
arriving together silently dropped one: whichever read first wrote last, over the top
of the other's change.
The field that went missing most visibly was `session`, copied back to null by a
watcher that had read the state before the ceremony landed in it. That is not a flash.
The session flow only re-emits when the `DkgSession` table changes, and a ceremony
waiting on a member who has not opened the app changes nothing, so the screen sat there
offering to start the ceremony it was showing.
`MutableStateFlow` with every write through `update { }` -- a compare-and-set that
retries on a loss, so a change can only ever be folded into the state that is current.
The one rule it imposes is that the block re-runs, so it must be pure: `pendingApproval`
is a suspending database lookup that used to sit *inside* the `copy`, and it now
happens above the call. `updateLoaded` carries the `as? Loaded ?: return` that all
twenty call sites used to write by hand.
**Two knock-ons.** `canStartRitual()` and `quorumRange()` were read from the composable
and are now passed the state, because reading a flow's `.value` inside composition
observes nothing -- the offer would have been decided once and never revised. Passing
the rendered state is also more correct while `ScreenStateTransition` still holds the
outgoing one. `DkgRitualScreen` and `DkgApprovalScaffold` collect with
`collectAsState()`.
**The button itself is right and stays.** Creating a robust group already opens the
ceremony -- `SelectChatRoomTypeViewModel.createNip17ChatRoom` calls `proposeRitual`
immediately after `createNip17ChatRoom` -- and this screen's offer is the deliberate
fallback for the case where that failed (`keyCeremonyNotStarted`) and for rooms created
before it existed. What was broken is when it appeared, not that it exists.
**Tests.** `DkgRitualStartOfferJvmTest`, two cases, and each was checked against its own
regression reinstated rather than only against the fix. The first asserts the *first*
`Loaded` already knows the room is running a ceremony, with a deliberately slow query so
the window is proved gone rather than hidden. The second forces the lost update to
happen rather than racing into it: the session watcher is parked inside `pendingApproval`
while the key-state watcher writes, and the write that follows must not carry the stale
copy over it.
**Not done.** `HomeViewModel`, `ChatMessageListViewModel`, `ProposalListViewModel` and
others still declare `by mutableStateOf` in a view model constructor. They are only at
risk where more than one flow folds into one state object; none was audited here.
964 jvm tests, 454 common tests, `m3Audit` meeting every budget.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kgothatso Ngako
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7a28b227d9 |
docs: record what the adoption plan built, and the eight places it chose differently
The note shipped as research and is now five commits of code, so it says so, in the shape docs/subgroups.md uses: the phases kept as written because they are the reasoning, and a table of where the build disagreed with them. Eight entries, and two are worth more than the rest. **A group can sign, truthfully by all six of `certifies`' questions, that it is its own parent** -- author, subject and named parent one room, the id deriving from the key, the signature verifying. The note never considered it. The self-parent guard began inside the offer branch, where it never ran, because the child branch catches such a certificate first and reads it as an ordinary child. A test caught it, and the gap predates this work: `subgroupsOf` would list the group as its own subgroup today. **The certificate's roster.** The note was careful that a founding certificate's name and `p` tags are the founding roster, frozen, and said nothing about adoption -- where there is no founding. The adopting group's admins are being asked about a group that exists, so what they can weigh is who runs it now, and the current roster is the honest value rather than a compromise. Still frozen the moment it is signed, still never read as live. The rest are smaller and all one shape, which is a note counting a thing and missing its thread: dropping `ChatRoom.parentChatRoomId` also drops the parameter that travelled through four files to reach its only writer; `stateFrom` returning "a state and a lineage" wanted a named type, and `LocalGroupKeyState` is a Room read model that is also a plain data class, so the pure verifier builds one with no database near it. One thing the note asked for is **not** done and cannot be: the key-state summary saying which parents are being *dropped*. A summary is pure and a disavowal is a difference against the row this device holds, so it belongs to the screen. The rough-size table becomes estimated against actual. It guessed about two dozen files and it was 39, with the UI three times its estimate -- a picker needs a route, a screen, a view model and a state, which the note had as one line -- and the repositories half of it, because `DkgRepository`'s changes were return types it never counted. Tests: 7 files, 53 new cases. `docs/README.md` moves the note from research to a phased plan that has been built, and its one-line summary now ends on the self-certificate rather than on the consent gap, which is closed. Docs only -- no code changed, so there are no test counts of this commit's own. The five it describes: 454 common tests, 962 jvm tests, `m3Audit` meeting every budget. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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e15d31b832 |
feat(subgroups): ask a group to adopt this one, and accept the offer when it comes
Phase 5 of docs/subgroups-multiple-parents.md, the UI. Phases 1-4 were dark; this is the flag, and it is the button. A group can now be given a second parent from the app. **Two affordances, on the child's own detail screen, under the parent cards.** Both belong there and not on the adopting group's screen: the child is what acquires the relationship, its quorum is what decides, and it mirrors the parent screen's existing "add subgroup". `SelectAdoptingGroupScreen` is the only new screen, because the acceptance needs none -- by then there is something to accept and a card does it. Its list is the **profile's own rooms** and cannot be anything else: a certificate is proposed inside the adopting group, so a candidate has to be a room the key in the chair can act in. `adoptingCandidatesFor` filters through `refuseAdoption` itself rather than through a copy of its rules, so screen and manager cannot drift. An empty list is a fact about this member rather than a failure, and the empty state says the reason outright -- a group cannot be offered as a parent by somebody who is not in it, so the remedy is a person rather than a button. **Tapping a row asks; it does not adopt, and the words have to carry that.** The snackbar says "asked that group to adopt this one", and the screen hands straight back to the room rather than going anywhere new. The offer card then says a group is a subgroup of another *only once its own quorum says so*, because rendered as a fact about the lineage it would be the consent gap reopened from the other end -- the one Phase 3 closed in the transcript. **The accept button is offered to whoever opens the screen and can act**, not only to the member who asked, for the reason docs/subgroups.md gives for the ritual screen's rung: every step after a ceremony is open to any admin holding a share. After it, the screen reloads rather than crossing the offer off -- the offer leaves the list when the state is signed and filed, which is a quorum away, so the card stays until the group has actually agreed. `canAddParent` wants a key state as well as a share, which `canAddSubgroup` does not: the certificate carries this group's threshold key and the acceptance re-announces that very state, so a room that has agreed nothing has neither half to work with. Hidden rather than disabled, the way the subgroup entry is. The picker is a pushed screen, so it takes an `onNavigateBack` and puts `NavigateBackButton` in its app bar's leading slot -- the rule `CLAUDE.md` gained while this was still a note, and the desktop target has neither a system back nor an edge swipe to fall back on. `offersTo` reads every certificate this device holds in **any** room rather than asking this one, because a certificate about this group is signed in the other group's room and filed against it -- asking this room would never find it. Each is checked by `classify`, and parents already in the lineage drop out, since an offer that has been accepted is not an offer. Ten strings in the catalogue in sentence case, spacing from `MaterialTheme.spacing`, colour from roles, `Decorative` on every icon beside a label, and the notifier read outside the handler with the caller's scope -- an acceptance is shown while the screen reloads around it. `inComparableGroups` stays private to `ChatRoomDetailScreen`: the upstream commit that moved it to the key extensions is in the fork's tree and not this one, and a second copy to add three spaces to an id is not worth having. **What is reachable and what is not.** Adding a parent and accepting one are both wired. `SubgroupManager.proposeDisavowal` is built, tested and has no button -- dropping a parent is a destructive-looking act that wants a confirmation step, and it belongs in its own change rather than bolted onto this one. 454 common tests, 962 jvm tests, `m3Audit` meets every budget with 0 title-case strings and 0 dp literals. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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b54ff61eb6 |
feat(subgroups): adopt an existing group, accept a parent, and stop claiming one
Phase 4 of docs/subgroups-multiple-parents.md, the operations. Two signings and no
ceremony, which is the whole of why this is cheap: the key exists, so there is no
ChillDKG, and the room exists, so there is nothing to create. Still unreachable -- no
screen offers any of it yet.
```
1. birth certificate, in the adopting group -> its quorum signs the child's id
2. key state, in the child itself -> the child's quorum re-announces,
carrying every certificate it accepts
```
**The order is forced and it decides who is deciding.** The key state carries the
certificate, so the certificate has to exist first -- which means the parent commits
first and the child answers second. Step 1 is an offer; step 2 is the acceptance, and
it is the only half that settles anything. Picking a parent is not choosing on the
child's behalf, and the wording of every message here says so.
**`proposeAdoption` is the founding certificate with the child already there.** Same
kind, same six checks on the other side, same room it has always been proposed in. What
differs is that the child's id and threshold key are read off its key state rather than
derived from a ceremony this device may not hold. The roster and the name are the
child's *current* ones -- on a founding certificate they are the founding roster
because there is nothing else they could be, and here the adopting group's admins are
being asked about a group that exists, so what they can weigh is who runs it now. Still
frozen the moment they are signed, and still never read as a live roster.
**`proposeAcceptance` carries the resulting set, not the addition.** The footgun is
real: a key state is replaceable and the newest wins *wholesale*, so a state naming
only the new parent would silently drop every existing one. The current lineage is read
off the row here rather than taken from the caller, and `SubgroupLineage.plus` is what
makes an addition an addition. It signs in the child's **own** room, which it can
because the room exists -- `propose`'s first branch holds and `signingPath` resolves off
the child's own key state, neither of which founding can do.
**`proposeDisavowal` is the same act with the set the other way**, and it revokes
nothing. A certificate is a signature and exists forever; what this removes is the
child's half of the link, which is the half that decides, since a lineage is what the
child's quorum most recently declared. The parent's own list does not follow --
`subgroupsOf` reads that group's certificates -- and the comment says so where somebody
will wonder.
**`refuseAdoption` is seven refusals and the picker is the same function.**
`adoptingCandidatesFor` filters the active profile's rooms through the guard itself
rather than through a copy of its rules, so screen and manager cannot drift. The list is
the profile's own rooms and cannot be anything else: a certificate is proposed inside
the adopting group, so a candidate has to be a room the key in the chair can act in, and
`getChatRoomListByUserPublicKey` is keyed by identity. An empty answer is a fact about
the member rather than a failure -- the remedy is a person, not a button.
Two refusals are new in kind. "This group has not agreed what it signs with" is the
overlap requirement surfacing: the certificate carries the child's threshold key, which
only the child's members hold, so a would-be parent with no sight of it cannot certify
anything. And a cycle check, because a lineage is a DAG now rather than a tree -- with
one parent nothing was ever tempted to recurse. `isAncestorOf` is depth-bounded and
visited-set guarded; it is advisory, since a device sees only the lineages it holds
states for, and the real protection is that an adoption needs the child's own quorum.
Fifteen tests. Every refusal once, including the cycle and the picker's filter, and then
the three operations by reading the proposed event back out of the signing session --
which is what catches the wholesale-replacement footgun: accepting a second parent has
to carry the first, and disavowing the only one has to leave a state that claims none
rather than one that claims nothing readable.
`parentWith` is now one case of a `marmotRoom` helper taking the id and the key, since
adoption needs two real group rooms at once rather than one; it keeps its own doc
comment and the warning it carries about `nostrGroupId` lengths, which is still the trap
it was. `certificate` gains a parent id so a sibling group can sign one.
454 common tests, 962 jvm tests, `m3Audit` meets every budget.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kgothatso Ngako
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e81659bf3b |
feat(subgroups): say what a key state proposal is asking, and tell a child it has been offered a parent
Phase 3 of docs/subgroups-multiple-parents.md, the two consent surfaces. The note calls the first of these the one change in the design that is not plumbing, and it is the only one that would have shipped a member a question they could not read. **`ProposedEvent`'s 30326 arm showed a derivation path and a ceremony id.** That was right while a key state was proposed once, at founding, by the coordinator who chose its lineage: the only question was which key the room signs with. A key state can be re-announced now, and that is exactly how a group is adopted -- its own quorum accepts a parent by signing a state that names one. A member approving that is deciding whether their group should answer to another, and `m/9420/0/0 · a1b2c3d4e5f6` answers a question nobody asked. The proposal is their only chance to check, since after it a quorum has spoken. So the parents lead when there are any, counted when there is more than one, in the lineage's canonical order so two devices describe one proposal the same way. The certificates are already in the tags the signature covers, so this costs a reader nothing it does not hold. What the summary cannot say is which parents are being *dropped*: that is a difference against the row this device holds and a summary is pure, so it belongs to the screen, and there is a comment where somebody will look for it. **And the child's room now hears the offer.** `ChatMessage`'s 30329 arm assumed a certificate in a room was that room's own act, because at founding it always is. An adoption signs the certificate first, in the adopting group, and the child's admins had no notice of it at all -- the first thing they would see is a proposal wanting their signature. Founding at least shows them the intent, since `DkgRitualEvents` puts `parent_group` on the ceremony proposal and the ritual screen names the group; adoption has no ceremony and so no hint. `SubgroupManager.classify` is the decision, pure and needing no database -- `certifies` checks a signature against a room id, and a room id is a public key, so an offer can be believed by a device that has never held the offering group's room. Two true things a certificate can be, and the room it arrived in is the whole of the difference: this room signed it about another, or another signed it about this one. A third room's business is nothing here whoever signed it. `TYPE_SUBGROUP_ADOPTION_OFFERED` writes a line and files nothing. It cannot file anything -- `GroupSignedEvent` declares a foreign key onto `ChatRoom`, so a child device with no row for the parent could not store the event -- and it does not need to, because the certificate reaches these devices for real inside the key state that accepts it. The wording carries that: a subgroup of theirs *only once this group agrees what it signs with again, naming them*. An offer rendered as a fact about the lineage would be the whole gap reopened from the other end. **A test found a real one while writing this.** A group can sign, truthfully by every check `certifies` makes, that it is its own parent: author, subject and named parent one room, the id deriving from the key, the signature verifying. The self-parent guard started out inside the offer branch, where it never ran -- the child branch catches such a certificate first and reads it as an ordinary child, which would put a group in its own list of subgroups. It is refused ahead of both branches now, and the test is named for what it pins rather than for the branch it was written against. That case predates this commit: `subgroupsOf` would have listed it today. Eleven tests. Six for `classify` in `SubgroupBirthCertificateEventTest`, which is where the three real quorums already are and where every case it decides is a question about a certificate; four for the summary in `ProposedEventTest`, including a state claiming a lineage it cannot state, which must read as the key alone rather than guess. One icon arm in `ChatTranscript`, because a subgroup type missing from that mapping renders as a chat bubble and looks exactly like a member having said it. 454 common tests, 947 jvm tests, `m3Audit` meets every budget. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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eba973331b |
feat(subgroups): schema 21 -- a parentage is a row, so a room can have two
Phase 2 of docs/subgroups-multiple-parents.md, the storage. Still dark: a lineage of two now verifies and is filed, and nothing in the app creates one until the adoption flow lands. `GroupKeyState` carried `parentChatRoomId` and `birthCertificateJson` because a group could only be founded with a parent, never adopted by a second. Those are `GroupKeyStateParent` now, one row per parent, and nothing about what they mean changed in the move -- including that the parent side is never a foreign key onto `ChatRoom`, for the three reasons that entity's comment now carries. **The primary key is the rule.** `(chatRoomId, parentChatRoomId)` is "one certificate per child per parent", which `SubgroupLineage.of` already refuses to break; the key is what makes it a property of the store rather than of a reader remembering. The cascade points at `GroupKeyState`, which is the one cascade here that is wanted: a lineage must not outlive the state that claimed it, or a room recreated at the same derived id would inherit a parentage nobody signed for it. **`replace` rewrites the lineage rather than merging it, and that is why it is a transaction.** A key state is replaceable and the newest wins *wholesale*, so the set of parents it names is the set. That is what makes a disavowal expressible at all -- a room drops a parent by re-announcing without it -- and merged rows would leave the dropped parent surviving the statement that dropped it. Deleting before inserting inside one transaction also stops a reader seeing a state beside somebody else's parents: were the writes separate, a concurrent read could land between them and get a state with the old lineage, which looks exactly like a true answer. An older state still changes nothing, now including its parents. **`stateFrom` returns `LocalGroupKeyState`, because a state and its lineage are one signed statement.** `lineageOf` checks every parent and drops the whole state if any one certificate fails -- the all-or-nothing rule generalised, for the reason it was written: keeping the provable half would file a group as having one parent when its own members see two. Each link is checked on its own, which is what lets a lineage be assembled a parent at a time, and there is a comment where somebody will look for the check that is deliberately absent: nothing requires the certificates to agree on the set. An earlier certificate cannot name a later co-parent, so requiring agreement would make every adoption cost a fresh quorum in every group that had already certified the room. The child's key state is the sole authority. **`ChatRoom.parentChatRoomId` is dropped, unread.** It was a cache of the verified value, written by `MarmotGroupCreation` and read in production by nothing at all -- the live answer went through `GroupKeyState`. Keeping it would mean a column holding *one* of several parents, which is worse than unused: a cache that is wrong. Its one query, `ChatRoomDao.observeByParentChatRoomId`, had only tests for callers and goes with it; the comment left in its place says where the two live answers are. `create`'s `parentChatRoomId` parameter threaded through four files to reach the write that is now gone, so it goes too rather than sitting dead. `MIGRATION_20_21` creates, copies, then drops -- the shape MIGRATION_9_10 established, and for the same reason it gives: `DROP TABLE` fires cascades and would delete the rows the migration had just written, so `ALTER TABLE ... DROP COLUMN` is used instead. `BundledSQLiteDriver` is pinned on every platform, so 3.35 is ours rather than the host's. The `WHERE` takes both halves of a parentage: a half row should not exist, since `stateFrom` has always dropped such a state rather than filing it, but this is the one moment the data is reshaped rather than re-derived and a half row copied forward would become a parent whose certificate is the string "null". Better to leave it behind -- the state keeps saying what the room signs with, and loses a lineage it could never prove. `parentOf` is `parentsOf` and returns a list, through the repository to `ChatRoomDetailUIState`; the parent card becomes one card per parent, keyed, because they are a set rather than a path -- neither is "the" parent and the order says nothing about which came first. Thirteen tests in `SubgroupDaoJvmTest`, rewritten for the table: the two cascades in both directions, a child with two parents appearing in both their lists, a re-announcement that drops a parent and one that clears the lineage entirely, an older state changing neither the state nor its parents, and the primary key collapsing a repeat to one row. In `GroupKeyStateTest`, Phase 1's "two parents are dropped" becomes "two parents are kept, each with its own certificate" -- it needed a third real group, since the earlier draft's second parent was the child certifying itself -- beside a new case where one bad certificate of two drops the whole state. 444 common tests, 937 jvm tests, `m3Audit` meets every budget. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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0690932252 |
feat(subgroups): a lineage is a set, and the tags that carry one in pairs
Phase 1 of docs/subgroups-multiple-parents.md, the wire. It ships dark: the event can now state a lineage of any size and nothing in this build produces one of more than one, because the row that would hold it does not exist until the next phase. A room's lineage was never really a field. `GroupKeyState` carried one parent and one certificate because a group was founded with a parent and never gained another; the moment it can be adopted, "the parent" is a set that had only ever held one thing. **`SubgroupLineage` is that set, and it holds the two invariants a caller cannot be trusted to remember.** No parent twice -- two entries naming one group is one parent asked twice, and `of` refuses rather than folding them, because each carries its own certificate and picking one would be this device deciding which of the parent's statements counts. And one canonical order, sorted by parent id, so two devices assembling the same lineage from the same certificates emit the same bytes. `plus` and `minus` are the two edits an adoption and a disavowal make; `minus` returning null is "nobody's child" rather than a failure, and revokes nothing -- a certificate is a signature and exists forever, and what it removes is the child's half of the link, which is the half that decides. **The pairs are adjacent, and that is for other people's builds.** A reader that predates this takes the first `parent_group` and the first `birth_certificate` off the tags and checks them against each other. Emitted as `id, certificate, id, certificate` it gets one real parent and that parent's own certificate, verifies them, and files a true but partial lineage -- one parent, correctly. Emitted as all the ids and then all the certificates it would pair the first id with a certificate that may belong to another parent, fail `certifies`, and drop the **whole state** -- losing the row that says which ceremony's share signs for that room, which is a worse outcome than not knowing about the second parent. The sort is what makes the pairing deterministic rather than incidental. **`parseLineage` counts each half twice, by tag name and by successful parse.** A half that is present and broken reads as absent through a parser, and only the broken kind would slide the pairing along by one and pair an id with somebody else's certificate. So an uneven number of halves, a half that does not parse, and a repeated parent are all refused, and `claimsParentage` -- unchanged, reading tag names alone -- is still what tells "claims nothing" from "claims something unreadable". **Two places refuse a second parent for now, and say so rather than truncating.** `propose` checks the lineage is one before it builds a row that can only hold one, and `parentageOf` drops a state claiming more. Taking the first of two would file a lineage the group did not sign and leave the device believing a group has one parent while its own members see two -- the same reasoning the existing all-or-nothing rule is built on. Nothing emits a second yet, so neither fires except on a state from a newer build, which is exactly the case that wants refusing rather than guessing. `SubgroupParentage` is untouched: still one pair, still unchecked, still the thing a lineage is made of. Nineteen tests. `SubgroupLineageTest` is new and pure, with no crypto at all -- the certificates in it are deliberately nonsense, because whether one is good is `certifies`' question and is asked on every read rather than at the door; it pins the two invariants, case-insensitivity on both, and that a certificate rides along with its own parent through the sort. Five go to `GroupKeyStateTest`, and the one worth keeping if any of this is rewritten asserts the *tag order* and then that the first id and the first certificate an older reader would take are a matched pair. 443 common tests, 933 jvm tests, `m3Audit` meets every budget. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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d97ba7228b |
docs: reconcile the adoption note with several profiles and a broadcast button
The seventy-one commits left the subgroup code byte-identical, so the first pass over
this note changed only a schema number. That was too quick a reading. None of what
arrived is *about* subgroups and four pieces of it bear on this design anyway.
**A built, unreachable path would put a birth certificate on public relays.**
`BroadcastGroupSignedEventViewModel` sends one group-signed event to relays a member
picks, and its own comment names the property that makes it dangerous here: the
signature is the group's, so any member holding the event can send it and no share of
the key is needed. It is not restricted by kind -- "the seed is the same for every
event of every kind" -- and nothing opens it today only because the rows that carried
the button went with the curated lists. The route is still registered and
`BroadcastButton` still built.
A certificate is the worst event in the app to send: the parent-child lineage, the
child's threshold key, and the founding admin roster in its `p` tags, which is a
membership list. `docs/subgroups.md` puts kind 30329 in the private 303xx range with
everything that never leaves an encryption, and
`SubgroupBirthCertificateEvent`'s own comment leans on that to say the addressable
semantics of the 3xxxx range never fire -- published they do, since it is `d`-tagged on
the child's room id, so relays would start treating certificates as replacements of
one another. So the note now carries a negative rule: the subgroups list and the parent
cards must never grow a broadcast button. It is also why relays are not the answer to
the overlap requirement, which they otherwise look like -- the price is publishing the
lineage and the roster to anyone, to save one person being in two groups.
**"One person in both groups" has a second reading now, and the mechanism wants
care.** The same human can be a P2 admin under one profile and hold C's share under
another, which satisfies both steps with no single key in both groups. `ChatRoom` is
keyed by the group id alone --
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Kgothatso Ngako
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acbf089378 |
docs: stop the adoption note naming a schema version, since two landed under it
Seventy-one commits of `mantra` merged in -- npub and nsec sign-in, several profiles on one device, three pulls from the Curated fork, a profile preview and a FAB sweep -- and none of it touches subgroups. `docs/subgroups.md`, `SubgroupManager`, `GroupKeyStateManager`, `GroupKeyStateEvent`, `nostr/subgroup/`, `GroupKeyState` and `ProposedEvent` are byte-identical, so the design stands as written. The only `FrostSigningManager` change is a comment, recording that putting a signed event on relays is now a member's separate act from `BroadcastGroupSignedEventScreen`. **The note said schema 19 -> 20, and 20 was taken while it sat there.** 19 was Phase 10's, for `DkgSession.participantPublicKeys` and `subject`; 20 is the several-profiles pull's, putting an owning identity on the queues. This is the second time the number has moved under a note that is not being built yet -- it was 18 -> 19 when first written three weeks ago -- which is twice too often for a figure nothing depends on. So it now says to read the version off `MantraDatabase` at build time, and the test line that named one does not. Everything else re-checked against the merged tree and unchanged: the four parent-indexed DAO reads are still test-only, `ChatRoom.parentChatRoomId` still has no production reader, `describe(purpose, path)` still takes no parent, and `GroupSignedEvent` still declares its foreign key onto `ChatRoom` -- the last of which is load-bearing for this design, since it is what forbids a child device storing a certificate signed by a group it is not in, and so forces the certificate to ride inside the key state. `docs/README.md` merged without a conflict: the row for this note sits where it was put, under the subgroups row, and the seven rows the sign-in and pull notes added append below it. Merged through the app's host sync rather than `git merge`, because the merge brings in a `.gitmodules` line -- `branch = master` on the lightning-kmp-app submodule -- which the sandbox is not meant to write. Docs only -- no code changed by this commit, so there are no test counts to report. The merged changes have not been built here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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3372023829 | Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/mantra' into claude/subgroups-multiple-parents-053be4 | ||
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Kgothatso Ngako
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76055bc0a8 |
docs: record the third pull, the profile preview and the extended FAB
Eleven commits reached the fork after the second pull had landed, and this note is their inventory, verdicts and record: the profile-preview line pulled whole, the extended-FAB sweep pulled with its seven removed screens resolved as still deleted, and d2a4298d -- one commit half in the curated-entries line Mantra took out and half in the broadcast line it kept -- pulled in part, by a PARTIAL rule that applies the kept paths and writes the rest into the note. Three things differed from the pulls before it and are set out: a brand token the normaliser could not see, NotYetOnCurare, fixed by a rule and a second rewrite that left the earlier forty-nine commits hash for hash the same; a merge whose join files carried only the dropped half, so that for the first time a join was not taken from the merge; and two conflicts the compiler found where git saw none, an import Mantra's projects section still needs and a jvmTest fixture recreated reduced to the room so that an upstream test lands byte for byte. The record is two phases: jvmTest 871 -> 909 -> 914, testDebugUnitTest 420 -> 424, every audit budget met at both cuts, the schema unchanged at version 20, and an exactness check whose every movement is named. The README gains the row and a sentence; the second plan points forward. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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4899dcbca7 |
feat(ui): a member on the room's screen opens the profile preview
The member rows on the chat room detail were the last "Profile detail" stub in the app: each pushed ImplementationPendingRoute. They now push ProfilePreviewRoute by the member's public key, which the nav host already serves, so a member arrives with the cached profile at once and the relays refreshing it, and the bar's action opens the chat that exists with them or starts one. The preview rather than the profile detail, because the detail is keyed by a kind 0's event id and a member whose profile has not arrived yet -- the "LOADING..." row MemberProfileSync exists for -- has none. The public key is the one thing every row has. A test pins both members opening the same screen, the named one and the one still named by its key. Replayed onto Mantra by docs/curated-to-mantra.md: ChatRoomDetailScreen.kt: the ImplementationPendingRoute import this commit removes is kept -- upstream's file had no other use for it once 808a3459 dropped the library, dialects and projects sections, and Mantra's projects section, which it kept, still routes "Add new project" through it. A semantic conflict rather than a textual one: the pick applied cleanly and the compiler found it; GroupSignedWorkFixtures.kt: the test this commit adds composes the screen against the fork's fixture of that name, which went with lines B, D and H -- it is recreated here reduced to the room alone, under the same names, so the test lands byte for byte. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@272b631633 |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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e66c174b4f |
feat(ui): the preview's action is the app's extended FAB
curated gained ExtendedFab while the preview was being built: every screen's bottom-bar action, with an enabled that borrows the disabled colours, marks the node disabled and drops the press. The preview had chosen a Button for exactly the reason that widget removes -- a FAB had no disabled state -- so after the merge it was the one screen whose primary action was shaped somewhere else. Now it is that FAB in a bottom bar, the indicator in its icon slot while the key package is still owed, and the reason line stays in the body above it. Hidden, bar and all, for a read-only identity. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@80735df86a |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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883bf1c84c |
refactor(ui): one extended FAB for every screen's primary action, with a gap in it
Twenty screens end their bottom bar in an `ExtendedFloatingActionButton` --
twenty-one buttons, one screen having two -- and eighteen of those were built
from the content-lambda overload with an `Icon` directly followed by a `Text`.
That overload puts nothing between the two, so the icon touched the label on
every one of them: visible in any render, and unnoticed because every FAB in
the app looked the same. Thirteen of the eighteen also carried the same
twenty-line block for looking disabled, because M3 gives a FAB no `enabled`.
**`ExtendedFab`, once, in widgets/buttons.** A label, an icon slot, `enabled`
and `onClick`. It draws `space150` between icon and label, which is the 12dp
M3 names `ExtendedFabEndIconPadding`; it borrows the disabled colours every
other button in the app uses, marks the node disabled so a screen reader does
not announce a button it is happy to press, and drops the press -- so the
thirteen call sites lose their `if (!canX) return@…` guards along with the
block and the `buttonColors` each of them declared. An icon slot rather than
an image, because two screens put a progress indicator where the icon was
while the action they started is out, and they still do.
**Not M3's `text`/`icon` overload, which would have spaced them for free.**
Its source wraps the label in `clearAndSetSemantics {}`: the label leaves the
merged semantics tree, a screen reader is told only what the icon says, and a
test cannot find the button by what it says -- five screen tests do. The
three FABs that were on that overload move to the widget too, and two of them,
Home's "New chat" and "Start the key ceremony", had a decorative icon beside
the cleared label and so no accessible name at all until now.
`ReadOnlyEntrancesJvmTest` had gone to the unmerged tree to find "New chat"
for this reason; the habit is harmless and stays. Every icon's description is
as it was, since several tests reach their FAB by it.
`ExtendedFabJvmTest` pins the decision: found by its label in the merged tree,
the icon before the label with a gap between, and disabled both announced and
refusing the press. The two docs that recorded the old state -- the
conformance account's "left alone" and the npub plan's unmerged-tree note --
each say what superseded them.
Verified with :composeApp:m3Audit (all budgets met, 0 dp literals in spacing
positions), :composeApp:compileDebugKotlinAndroid and :composeApp:jvmTest
(1088 tests, 3 new).
Replayed onto Mantra by docs/curated-to-mantra.md: AcceptCuratedSuggestionScreen.kt: deleted, as this commit deletes it upstream; AddGroupPostScreen.kt: deleted, as this commit deletes it upstream; EditGroupCuratedSchemaScreen.kt: deleted, as this commit deletes it upstream; EditGroupNostrProfileScreen.kt: deleted, as this commit deletes it upstream; EditGroupRelaysScreen.kt: deleted, as this commit deletes it upstream; GroupCuratedEntriesScreen.kt: deleted, as this commit deletes it upstream; ProposeGroupEventScreen.kt: deleted, as this commit deletes it upstream.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pulled-From: curated/curated@ca6c16beb0
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Kgothatso Ngako
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b3379f8117 |
feat(groups): broadcast every accepted entry from one button, each to where its own would go
The entries screen had one "Broadcast" under each card, and each opened `BroadcastGroupSignedEventScreen` for that one entry: a group that has accepted twenty entries into its lists sent them with twenty trips through the relay picker. This is the other button. "Broadcast all", an extended FAB in a bottom bar, sends every entry on the screen, newest first, one after another, and says under each card what its relays answered. Behind no gate, like the button under each card: sending what the group has already signed takes no share of the key. **Each entry goes where its own broadcast screen would have started.** The list that screen seeds -- `defaultRelaysFor`: the group's General write relays or the app's publish set, plus the list's own relays, minus what the group has blocked -- is what a member who reads nothing and presses the button sends to, and this button is that member with twenty entries. The group's relay lists are read into the loaded state for it; the list's relays come off the entry, which carries its schema, so the rule is handed that one schema rather than all of the group's. Nothing is shown before the press, which is the difference from the one-event screen and the reason that screen stays: a refusal is answered there, where the relay can be changed and the send tried again. **One entry at a time, on purpose.** The rows fill in top to bottom, so the member can see where the batch is; and a public relay sent twenty events in one burst answers "rate-limited" to most of them, which would make the button worse than the presses it saves. Each entry's send has the same ceiling as a single broadcast and the batch has no other, since a long list is meant to take a while. It goes to the pool directly rather than through the queue, for the reason `BroadcastGroupSignedEventViewModel` gives, and it is only as durable as the press: leaving the screen ends it where it is. **The send is shared rather than copied.** What a relay's answer becomes -- an OK, a rejection in the relay's words, a failure, or no answer when the whole send runs out of time -- was decided inside `broadcast()` on the one-event view model. It is now `sendToRelays` on that model's companion, beside `defaultRelaysFor` and `wireEventOf`, and `broadcast()` keeps only the state around it; the thirteen tests on it pass unchanged. The words for an answer moved the same way, out of the relay row and into `RelayOutcome.label()`, which both screens now use. **What the member is told.** A line above the cards -- "Sending entry 3 of 12…", then "Accepted by every relay for 11 of 12 entries." -- persistent rather than a snackbar, because it is the answer the member came for and a snackbar would be gone before the last card had been read. Under each card, "Accepted by n of m relays." in the one-event screen's words, and one line per relay that did not say OK, named with its reason, because "blocked: not on the allow list" is something a member can act on and a count of two out of three is not. An entry with nowhere to go -- everything the seed would name blocked -- is marked so rather than sent to nobody. The FAB looks disabled while a batch is out, and a second press is refused. `GroupCuratedEntriesViewModelJvmTest` pins where each entry goes, that the next waits for the last to settle, what the answers become, and the refusals; the screen test drives the button end to end and checks that each answer sits between its card and that card's own broadcast. The shared fixture entry now carries the `a` root a real entry has -- without it the seed rule could not find the list's relays, which the first run of these tests found. Verified with :composeApp:m3Audit (all budgets met), :composeApp:compileDebugKotlinAndroid and :composeApp:jvmTest (1085 tests, 7 new). Replayed onto Mantra by docs/curated-to-mantra.md, in part: only its broadcast half: sendToRelays lifted into the view model's companion, the RelayOutcomeLabel widget and the screen reading it, and the GroupSignedEvent comment. The entries screen's Broadcast-all button, its view model and state, its tests, its five strings and its nav-host wiring are line D, which Mantra took out (docs/curated-to-mantra.md). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@d2a4298d25 |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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d7d6f5a922 |
chore(scripts): a partial pick, and the seven deletes the FAB sweep needs
Two rules for the third pull. ca6c16be moves twenty screens onto one ExtendedFab; seven of them -- the curated-list and group-identity screens -- were taken out with lines B, D and H, so each is a modify/delete conflict that resolves as "still deleted", the DELETE rule it already had for one test file, now for a set. d2a4298d is half in line D and half in a line Mantra kept: its Broadcast-all button on the entries screen is gone here, but the sendToRelays it lifted into the broadcast view model's companion, the RelayOutcomeLabel widget and the screen reading it are the broadcast line Mantra holds. PARTIAL applies the diff restricted to the kept paths, commits it under the original message and trailer, and writes what was left out into the note, so the four shared files stay identical to the fork's and the FAB commit lands on them cleanly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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a8ba589ecc |
docs: record what the profile preview plan built, and the places it chose differently
Two strings that already existed, a room rule that follows the old code's intent rather than its branch, a retry that never takes an open chat back to checking, the flag the ordering cases asked for, and the test harness the other view models use. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@b3bcc06047 |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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2adc503613 |
feat(chat): the preview's button knows whether it can be pressed
Phase 4 of docs/npub-profile-preview.md. Phases 1-3 moved the twenty-second dead end one screen later: a person found on an indexer, a press, and InitiatingNewChat waiting for a key package that someone who has never opened Curare will never have published. The preview now reads the answer before the press. A room that already exists opens; a key package that is here enables "Start new chat"; one that is not, once the relays have had their time, disables it with the reason under it and a try-again that asks the DM relays alone. The existing-room check was a loop with a TODO inside initiateNewChat; it is ChatRepository.findDirectMessageRoom now -- a room whose members are exactly the two keys, or the one key when they are the same -- read by both screens and pinned by a test on an in-memory database. The old size-one branch would have opened any room the peer sat in alone, whoever they were. Both halves are observed together, as the chat screen does: a key package arriving after the profile touches a different table, and a collect on the profile alone would never see it. A room is read once up front, because a key package is meant to be used once and the relays need not hold a fresh one for someone you already talk to. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@d649098504 |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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5ba888d9f9 |
feat(ui): the new-chat dialog opens the person, and no longer starts the chat
Phase 3 of docs/npub-profile-preview.md, and the user-visible change: "Direct message via npub" now shows who this is before anything is created. The dialog's button reads "Find profile" and pushes ProfilePreviewRoute; the chat is started from there. The field keeps what it parsed rather than whether it parsed. Its check and its decode used to be two different functions, which is how "nostr:npub1…" passed the one and failed the other, closing the dialog with nothing to show for it; CredentialParser.npubOrNull is the sign-in decode exposed for an address field -- an nsec is null there, because a field asking whom to write to must never take a secret for an answer -- and the enabled button and the route it pushes read the same key. The nip05 branch still lands on the placeholder, and the test says so. "Start chat" goes with its only reader. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@923b59ec32 |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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39c056a2f2 |
feat(ui): the profile preview screen, reachable by nothing yet
Phase 2 of docs/npub-profile-preview.md. ProfilePreviewRoute is keyed by public key, because that is all the entrance has, and ProfilePreviewScreen draws the four states over a constant bar: the npub above the indicator while the relays are asked, the person -- avatar, name, nip05, the whole of the about, the npub that was pasted -- and under them "Start new chat", which hands over the route the dialog pushes today and creates nothing here. Not found is the sign-in screen's sentence with a try-again; a read-only identity is shown the person and nothing to do, and ReadOnlyEntrancesJvmTest gains the row. Registered in the host with the room replacing the preview, as it replaces the profile detail. No button navigates to it until Phase 3. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@8973c0058e |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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f84ae13394 |
feat(chat): the lookup behind a profile preview, and the sync it shares with the chat screen
Phase 1 of docs/npub-profile-preview.md. No screen yet: a view model that finds the person behind a pasted npub and says when it has stopped looking, over the row the device already holds -- cached first -- and two asks of the relays. The three-kind filter the chat screen queued privately is now DirectMessagePeerSync.requests, and the kind 0 alone goes to the indexers as profileRequests: a key pasted from elsewhere has lived elsewhere, and a three-kind filter sent to an indexer comes back with the kind 0 and nothing else. "A placeholder is not a profile" was spelled out twice as a comparison against GENESIS_AT; it is Profile.isResolved() now, and both sites read it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@37c6f7eabb |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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69aa43a108 |
docs: plan a profile preview before a chat, starting from what the button is allowed to do
The "Direct message via npub" option goes straight from a pasted string to an MLS room. The plan puts a screen between them, keyed by public key because that is all the dialog has, and keeps the room's creation where it is: four decisions -- where the preview lives, what "found" means when a row can be a placeholder, that the button hands over rather than creates, and that it waits for the key package so the twenty-second dead end is answered before the press -- and four commit-sized phases with the tests for each. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@db268a53d3 |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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0728f3f969 |
chore(scripts): teach the normaliser the brand inside a CamelCase identifier
The fork's profile-preview line names a Readiness state NotYetOnCurare, and the normaliser's \bCurare\b rule cannot see a brand that has no word boundary in front of it: the first rewrite of the eleven new commits left seventeen occurrences of it in code, tests and the note. One rule, for a brand preceded by a lower-case letter or digit and followed by an upper case letter or the end of the word, maps it to NotYetOnMantra. Only the Curare generation gets the rule: "Curated" is product vocabulary at the tip (CuratedSchemaEvent) and a CamelCase-embedded Curated is therefore not a brand. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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213535278a |
docs: record what the profiles pull built, and the reverse direction measured
The plan's top now says it was built, the same day it was written: the ten commits in four phases at the dry run's numbers exactly, Phase 6's two native items done, and its other three -- pushing the removal, the two reverse-pulls, the fork decision -- named as the user's. Phase 6 gains its own Built paragraph: what the refusal changed and did not change in the DAO's welcome branch, the four re-pointed anchors, and a measurement the plan had only asserted -- that a Mantra commit offers itself to the fork cheaply. git format-patch on the refusal commit, four inverse rules over the patch text, and git apply --check on a scratch worktree of curated/curated at 29027f2b: it applies cleanly, five files. That is the shape a normaliser running the other way would take, and it is recorded so the fork can take the commit in seconds rather than by hand. The README's reading-order sentence and the first plan's pointer say "built" where they said "planned". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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2620e43d57 |
docs: re-point the profiles note's four line anchors at Mantra's tree
The note arrived with the pull and anchors four of its links to line numbers -- three into MantraNavHost.kt and one into DatabaseNostrRepository.kt -- that were the fork's. Mantra's nav host is 264 lines shorter than the fork's, having lost the group-identity block in the removal, and its repository grew a constructor parameter in Phase 6 of the same plan, so all four pointed a few lines wide of what the sentence around them describes: the key read off the current route (now :404), the sign-in and create tails (:741 and :537), and the pump reads that used to drain whatever was pending (:118). They describe the tree before the line was built, which is what that section of the note is about, and each still lands on the thing described; only the numbers moved. Phase 6, item 2, of docs/curated-to-mantra-profiles.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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679d5249b2 |
fix(groups): refuse a welcome for a group another profile on this device holds, and say so in the room
Phase 6 of docs/curated-to-mantra-profiles.md, the fourth decision's follow-up, written natively before the several-profiles line reaches users. ChatRoom is keyed by the group id alone, and the MLS state, the DKG sessions and the FROST shares all hang off the room; before several profiles on a device the second local member could not exist, and after it a user can invite their own second profile into their own collective. What the DAO did with that Welcome was already a refusal, by accident: the welcome branch of indexNostrEvent checks for an existing room before it writes one, so the joiner's state never overwrote the holder's -- but the branch could not tell a redelivered Welcome for our own room from a Welcome for a room another profile holds, logged "Chat Room already exists" at warning level for both, and told nobody. The invitee never joined, the inviter's device believed the invite had landed, and the failure had the exact shape of "the other device never got it". The branch now distinguishes the two by the room's userPublicKey. The same profile's redelivery stays the quiet no-op it was. Another profile's Welcome is refused with a warning naming both keys, and a membership line is written into the room that exists -- the holder's, because it is the only room on the device the group has and the holder is the one who can act on it: leave, or tell the inviter which profile to invite instead. The line is TYPE_WELCOME_REFUSED_OTHER_PROFILE, in MEMBERSHIP_TYPES so the transcript draws it as a notice rather than a bubble, with the error tint and a PersonOff icon since the person and not the invite is what it is about; its content is a whole sentence naming the inviter, the invitee and the holder, resolved at write time the way the other membership lines are. The invitee's key package bundle is left unconsumed, as the branch always left it; a second Welcome for the same package arrives here again and writes a second line. The test is two devices for real: an MLS group on the inviter's database, a key package whose private keys the invitee's database holds -- the fixture now returns the bundle beside the public package, and marmotKeyPackageFor is a projection of it -- and the Welcome the invite queued, sealed the way sealGiftWrapPayload seals one and stored through storeNostrEvent under the invitee's key. Three cases: the group held by another profile is refused, its row and MLS state untouched, the line in the room naming all three and the bundle unconsumed; the same profile welcomed twice writes nothing; and with no profile in the way the Welcome is a join, which is what shows the fixture is real. jvmTest 868 -> 871, both compilers clean, every audit budget met. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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310d3bbbd3 |
docs: record Phase 5 of the profiles pull, which completes the ten
9bb34004, 88577bb5 and 29027f2b landed as |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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ba5ef72385 |
docs: record what the multiple-profiles plan built, and the places it chose differently
Phases 1–8 are implemented, in order, one commit each; Phase 9 is the rollout and stays as written. The plan's phases are kept as the reasoning, and the table at the top says where the build chose differently: the repair reads before it writes and hands the listing its result; one WalletAttached outcome with two ways in; the node stop and the relay scope injected for their tests; the default save that cannot crash; a ProfilesViewModel over flows; a NewProfileWriter and a route flag where the plan expected the create screen's existing writer to serve; the colliding id on the outcome rather than on the enum; the DAO's own requests left unowned because they fetch public kinds; the inbox reopened by re-indexing each wrap in its own transaction rather than by lifting the unseal branch out; and the round trip's A made through the create view model with a never-started PhoenixBusiness for the switch to stop. Three things found on the way and in no phase are recorded beside the table: the library's unsynchronised global-preferences cache, reached by two threads at once for the first time, now behind JvmGlobalPrefs on the jvm target; the same cache's consequence for tests that construct the sovereign view model; and the gift wrap seal's link to its wrap, a foreign key that existed and was never written until the inbox sweep asked the question it answers. The README's row and reading order say the note is built, and name switchToIdentity where they named switchToWallet. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@29027f2b92 |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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72b9d3d2ed |
test(identity): several profiles, both ways, and a boot
Phase 8 of docs/multiple-profiles.md: the seams of Phases 1 through 7 in a row, through the real view models on an in-memory database with a real key store. A is made from a phrase through the create view model and the seed writer, the way Landing makes the first profile: both files written, and listed once as a profile with a wallet attached, under the wallet's id, with the credential's key. A is opened with a node behind it -- a PhoenixBusiness that was never started, which is enough to make it one the switch has to stop. B's npub is signed in from inside through the sign-in view model; the switch stops A's node, B is open and read-only, the machine routes it from its placeholder, and nothing was ever started for a public key. A kind 1 queued for A while B is open waits three seconds unsigned; back to A, and it goes out, with nothing more stopped since B had no node. C is created from inside through the bare-key writer: a key, not a second wallet, routed, with no node, and the switch to it stops A's node again. C and B are forgotten through ForgetIdentity with the view model's writers, the default is cleared and the selector reset: A is listed alone, its credential is the only entry left in the file, B's and C's account rows went with them, and A itself cannot be forgotten because a wallet is attached. Then a fresh view model over the same directory, which is what a cold boot is: the repair finds nothing to do, A is listed from its credential rather than derived, and StartupChoice opens it without asking. A navigation state is matched to a profile by whichever step it is at -- UnsignedProfile, UnqueuedProfileSynchronization, UnannouncedProfile through the event the broadcast request names, ProfileLoaded -- because with the notary running, A's account moves from unsigned to announced-pending while the test looks, and what the test asserts is whose account it is, not which step it reached. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@88577bb5c3 |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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8edb52fff3 |
feat(ui): leaving one profile among several
Phase 7 of docs/multiple-profiles.md. Small, because the forget sequence was built right. Sign out of a read-only identity and "forget this key" for a bare key both run ForgetIdentity and then the tail -- re-list, clear the default since Phase 3, show the selector with what remains or Landing if nothing does -- and that is the right behaviour with several profiles as well; nothing in the sequence changes. A profile with a wallet attached answers WalletAttached from Phase 1 and is offered neither exit: its sign-out row stays the pending route, for the reason both sign-in plans gave, and it is now also the only way such a profile can leave, since the repair would write its credential back. What changes is that the user is no longer stuck behind it -- "switch profile" is the row above. The not-found screen learns about the others. It offers "try again" and, for a read-only identity, "use a different key", which forgets it; with another profile on the device it now offers "switch profile" as well, for every kind, pushing the switcher -- which has a back button, so the screen is still there if the user changes their mind. The identity that was not found stays listed; forgetting it remains a separate decision. The nav host passes the callback only when the listing holds more than one. Tests: ReadOnlyEntrancesJvmTest -- with another profile on the device the not-found state offers the switch beside the read-only exit and it calls through once; a signing identity that was not found gets it above the set-up form; with one profile there is nothing to switch to. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@9bb340042d |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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b92659fe92 |
docs: record Phase 4 of the profiles pull, the migration to version 20
759199f2 landed as
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Kgothatso Ngako
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72afe8aa40 |
feat(sync): a fetch queue per identity, and the inbox reopened on activation
Phase 6 of docs/multiple-profiles.md. The one data problem, closed from both ends. The two queues that fetch -- SynchronizeNostrEventRequest and NegentropySynchronizeRequest -- gain a nullable ownerPublicKey, the identity that asked, because what a fetch brings back is opened with the fetcher's key. The pumps ask for their own: the head of the queue among this identity's requests and the ones nobody owns, so that a request another identity queued waits for that identity. Rows from before the column read back null, meaning "the device's", which is what they were, and any identity may drain them. The broadcast queue deliberately gets no owner: a signed event is anyone's to carry, and holding A's outgoing message until A is opened again would be a delivery failure the user would never be told about. Room version 20, an AutoMigration for two nullable columns, with the schema export committed beside its predecessors. The stamp is the repository's, not the call site's. Eighteen view models and two DAO paths queue requests, and every one of them does so as the active identity -- a screen cannot queue anything as anyone else. DatabaseNostrRepository takes the identity flow at construction, which meant moving the view model above the repositories in the nav host, and stamps every request it queues where the caller stamped nothing; a negentropy request carries its owner into the REQ it becomes. The DAO's own requests -- the placeholder-profile syncs it plants while indexing, and the participant syncs of a Marmot join -- stay unowned, on purpose and against the plan's sketch: they fetch public kinds that need no key to open, and any profile that is open may as well fetch them. The other end: wraps that were fetched under the wrong key -- before this, or by a read-only identity whose nsec was pasted later, the case the npub plan's DAO guard left with the words "the key that opens this one may be signed in later" and no code behind them. storeNostrEvent never indexes an event it already holds, so a wrap that arrived under the wrong key stayed closed for good: the live subscription re-received it, the DAO saw a known id, and returned. NostrDao.reopenInbox finds every wrap addressed to the active key that no seal names and runs each through indexNostrEvent again under the right key, one transaction per wrap so that one that cannot be opened rolls back its own changes and the next is still tried; one pass, since wraps do not depend on one another. It runs from the sync pumps' collector once per activation, for an identity that can sign, before the live inbox and the broadcast pump are launched -- so the sweep and the live subscription are not opening the same wrap at once; both are idempotent by event id. Found on the way: GiftWrapSeal.giftWrapMessageId, a foreign key to the wrap a seal came out of, existed and was never written, so nothing in the database could say which wraps had been opened. decryptGiftWrapSeal now sets it. A seal from before reads back null, is swept once, and comes back with the link -- the reindex is idempotent, and persistInboundChatMessage already files a message it has once. Tests: ReadOnlyGiftWrapDaoJvmTest -- a wrap for us stored under another profile's key is stored and not opened, a re-delivery under our key changes nothing, the sweep opens it once and finds nothing the second time; the other profile's sweep and a read-only pair open nothing; a wrap stored read-only is opened once the key is here. OwnedRequestQueueJvmTest -- A's request is offered to A and not to B, nobody's to both, oldest first; the repository stamps what it queues with the identity that is open, nothing when none is, and keeps an owner a caller named. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@759199f2af |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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ae8cde889e |
docs: record Phase 3 of the profiles pull, and the one resolution
Four commits landed as |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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ccb9942a18 |
feat(identity): adding a profile from inside, as a key and not a second wallet
Phase 5 of docs/multiple-profiles.md. The two entrances, and the two things
that were only safe with one profile.
Under the list, on the switcher and on the startup selector alike, two rows:
"sign in with a key", to the sign-in screen, and "create a new profile", to
the create screen. Both push a screen that has a back button. Landing is not
one of them -- it has no back button and clears the stack on its way out,
because it is the first-run screen, and pushing it from inside would make it
a pushed screen on some days and a root on others. A device with one profile
can now be given a second, which it could not: Landing showed only when the
device held nothing.
A profile created from inside is a bare key. CreateProfileScreen generated
twelve words behind its form -- a seed, a node, a wallet, and at the NIP-06
path the key that becomes the profile -- which is right for the first
profile on a device, the one the wallet will belong to, and wrong for the
second: a user who wants another profile has not asked for another
Lightning node, another set of channels, or a second phrase with funds
behind it. The screen now takes a NewProfileWriter and does not know which
it was given: seedProfileWriter from Landing, bareKeyProfileWriter from the
switcher, thirty-two random bytes written the way a pasted nsec is.
CreateProfileRoute carries the choice. The view model writes the secret
first, then the six bootstrap events for the key it derives, then hands the
id to the tail -- so the events are only ever queued for a key the device
holds, and they are in the database before the tail activates the identity,
an ordering the sign-in screen documents as load-bearing and the create flow
used to get away with by luck. The tail gains the popUpTo(0) the sign-in
tail has. A second wallet is not offered from inside; a pasted recovery
phrase still brings its own.
"End this" goes. It wiped the database -- every profile's rooms, MLS state,
key packages and queues -- from the screen whose purpose is to add a
profile; it was only ever a development exit, and with several profiles on
a device it was a way to lose the others. wipeDatabase leaves the view model
and stays on the repository for the tests that use it.
A key already on the device is refused with the id it is listed under.
WriteNostrCredentialResult.AlreadyExists and WritingSeedState.Error.
SeedAlreadyExists carry it -- the wallet's id where a seed derives the key
-- and the sign-in screen's error state gains one action, "switch to it",
which is the sign-in tail with that id. From Landing "already on this
device" was the whole message; from inside it is a sentence with an obvious
next step, and a duplicate paste becomes the fastest switch in the app.
Found on the way, and fixed in the jvm actuals: DataStoreManager caches one
GlobalPrefs per process behind an unsynchronised check-then-set, and
DataStore refuses a second instance over the same file. Two first calls at
once -- the listing on IO and a sign-in's write, or the startup screen on
Main -- could both see the empty cache and both build one, and the loser
threw "multiple DataStores active for the same file" at first use. The test
for this phase hit it one run in three. JvmGlobalPrefs is now the one way
the jvm target reaches the prefs, under a lock; Android goes through the
Application's single instance and never raced; the library's own callers
come at node start, when the cache is long populated.
Tests: AddProfileFromInsideJvmTest, through the real view models on an
in-memory database -- A open, B's nsec committed and switched to, and back,
both accounts intact with their own kind 0; A's key pasted again refused
with A's id; a profile made through the bare-key writer lists as a bare key
with the kind 0 first of its six bootstrap rows, none signed yet, and no
node ran. SignInToProfileViewModelJvmTest and IdentityWriterJvmTest assert
the ids the three refusals carry. ProfilesScreenJvmTest: the two rows call
their callbacks and switch nothing, under the caption that the open profile
stays. CreateProfileScreenJvmTest: the state that carried "end this" is
composed and the words are not there.
Replayed onto Mantra by docs/curated-to-mantra.md: CreateProfileViewModel.kt: this commit's import block taken whole -- Mantra had already moved the nostrPublicKey() import to the library's (
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Kgothatso Ngako
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5654e4624b |
feat(ui): the switcher, showing the nostr profile and what the device holds for it
Phase 4 of docs/multiple-profiles.md. One pushed screen, and the startup selector brought up to match it. ProfilesRoute, reached from the profile tab's row -- "Switch profile", where it said "Change account" and went to the pending screen -- and drawn by ProfilesScreen: a top app bar with a back button, and WalletsSelector as its whole content with the open profile above the divider and the others below. Tapping another row is switchToIdentity and nothing else; the observer restarts the app as that identity through its lock gate, so the screen is never around to see the result. Tapping the open row does nothing. Three states, said so: loading while the list is read, which in practice is never seen; an unreadable key file, through ErrorState with a retry that re-lists; and the list. Empty cannot happen while something is signed in and the screen does not pretend it can. One column at every width. The row is offered to every kind: a read-only identity can leave for another profile the same way a signing one can. ProfilesViewModel joins the flows the app already holds -- the listing state, the identities, the active identity, the wallet metadata -- to the profile rows for the listed keys, through NostrRepository.observeProfilesOf, one map that moves when any of them does. Nothing in it writes. What a row shows changes. WalletsSelector showed "Default name" over a random emoji for every row, because nothing in this app writes the wallet metadata's name, and two profiles side by side both called Default name and told apart by a bech32 string is not a switcher. The row now takes the nostr profile -- humanReadableNameOrPubkey over ProfileAvatar, the widgets the profile tab draws itself with -- with the npub on the second line, and falls back to the npub over the metadata's emoji for a key the device has no kind 0 for yet: one just created, or a read-only one that was never found. And it says what the device holds for the profile before the tap: "Wallet" for a seed attached, beside the "Read only" that was already there, and nothing for the plain case of a bare key. It is the difference between a profile that can be signed out of and one whose sign-out is a wallet question, and between two profiles with the same name. The startup screen draws the same widget and gets the same map through rememberProfilesOf, so both lists look the same. The selector's dead globalPrefs parameter goes with the rewrite. Tests: ProfilesScreenJvmTest, on the unmerged tree, with a wallet-attached A open, a bare B and a read-only C -- A by its nostr name with its npub and "Wallet" under it, B and C by their npub with only C labelled, no "Default name" anywhere, the open one drawn above the others; tapping A calls nothing and tapping B calls the switch once with B's id; an unreadable key file is an error whose retry is counted; the bar has a back button. ReadOnlyEntrancesJvmTest asserts "Switch profile" for both kinds. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@25464595f4 |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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73a0e5b9c2 |
feat(identity): which profile opens, on launch and after a switch
Phase 3 of docs/multiple-profiles.md. The startup screen learns to agree with the switch. The table that picks what to open is lifted out of the screen's remember into StartupChoice.resolve, where it can be read and tested, because its order was the whole decision and it was wrong in the one way a switch would hit: "!startWalletImmediately -> null" sat above "desiredWalletId != null", and nothing ever set the flag back to true. So after the first visit to the selector, every sign-in on that device landed on the selector instead of the profile it had just signed in. Two rows move: what a switch or a sign-in named goes above the user's earlier "show me the list", since it is the more specific instruction; and the single-identity row drops below it, since when both are set they name the same thing. The default is written. GlobalPrefs.getDefaultWallet has been read by startup since Phoenix and saved by nothing in this app, so a cold boot with two profiles was the selector every time with no memory of which one was open. setActiveIdentity now saves the id it activates -- every activation goes through it, startup for all three kinds and the two tails through startup -- so the default is always the profile most recently open. The two forget tails clear it, since the default is the one memory of an identity that would otherwise outlive it. Both writes are wrapped: a default that could not be recorded is a selector on the next boot, not a crash now. The screen reads the saved value as a default only when it names a wallet, which is the one thing left to decide at the call site. The startup screen's literals go to the catalogue, and "wallet" goes with them except in the one place a wallet is what is starting: "Starting wallet" is shown from StartupViewState.StartingBusiness, which only the branch with a wallet attached reaches, and stays. The rest become "Preparing profiles", "Opening profile", "Decrypting", "Loading preferences", "Unlock to continue" and "Could not load the profiles on this device"; the selector's title is "Choose a profile", and select_a_wallet goes. Tests: StartupChoiceTest in commonTest, one case per row and the two orderings this phase is for -- a desired id opens even after the user once asked for the list, and one identity with the list asked for still shows it. IdentitySwitchJvmTest gains the cold boot: activate A then B, and a fresh view model over the same directory resolves B without asking; forget the default, and it resolves nothing. Found on the way and recorded in the test: DataStoreManager caches the global preferences once per process, bound to whichever directory was current when the first test in the JVM asked -- the same trap the nsec plan recorded for user preferences -- so the test reads the default through the view model's own instance rather than one of its own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@00fc996995 |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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84ac84ccaf |
feat(identity): a switch that tears down what it should
Phase 2 of docs/multiple-profiles.md. The transition, made correct, with nothing yet calling it from a screen: the view model, one manager, and three one-line actuals. switchToWallet becomes switchToIdentity, and does what a switch is: remember which one, set startWalletImmediately back to true -- a switch is the user saying which one, and the flag was only ever the user saying "show me the list"; nothing set it back before because nothing could switch -- clear the active identity, and stop the node of the profile being left, if it had one. The identity is cleared before the node is stopped, so that every collector that could reach the business is cancelled before the stop runs. The test is business != null, not the kind: whether the profile being left has a node behind it is the fact, and the kind is how it currently comes to be true. stopPlatformBusiness is an expect beside updateBusinessActiveInUI, for the reason that one is: BusinessManager is a per-platform object. Its three actuals call stopBusiness, which existed on every platform and nothing called. The manager is injected into the view model as a function so that the branch can be pinned without a node. RelaysSocketManager.observeActiveUserId becomes a child of collectLatest -- the shape the pumps and the notary already had. It used to keep one job per pubkey on its own scope and cancel only the job for the pubkey being started, which meant a switch left the previous identity's observer running: two observers feeding updateRelayPools, and the one pool following whichever relay list emitted last. The map goes; a null identity closes nothing, since the pool is shared by pumps a null identity has already cancelled, and the next identity's list replaces it through changeRelays as it always did. The scope is injectable and relayUrls is exposed, both for the test. The sign-in and create tails keep their own navigate beside the observer's, now with a comment saying why: the navigation state is a StateFlow, an update to a state equal to the current one emits nothing, and the explicit navigation is what guarantees the stack moves even on the day the state does not. Tests: IdentitySwitchJvmTest, through the real SovereignWalletViewModel with a real notary and navigation machine on an in-memory database -- A open and a kind 1 queued for A is signed; switch to B, the identity clears, the machine goes to startup, B is activated the way startup does and routed from its account; a kind 1 queued for A now waits three seconds unsigned, and goes out when A is back. Leaving a profile with a PhoenixBusiness behind it -- constructible without a node, since everything in it is lazy -- stops that node once; leaving nothing, or a bare key, stops nothing. RelaysSocketManagerSwitchJvmTest over a fake relay repository and fake sockets: after the switch the pool holds B's relays, a re-emission of A's list changes nothing -- the line that fails against the old observer -- and an identity whose list is still empty leaves the pool as it was, which is the behaviour updateRelayPools has always had for an empty list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@9b3a19278f |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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d6d87ed208 |
docs: record Phase 0 and Phase 2 of the profiles pull
Phase 0 needed one thing this plan did not predict in detail: the worktree's library checkout sat at 01489b8, an older master whose object store did not even hold the pinned 84cc44c, while its nested chain was already at the pinned four. One fetch from the main checkout's submodule and a detached checkout made the tree clean. The rewrite was rebuilt from the fork point and produced the same forty-nine rewritten commits as the dry run, hash for hash: filter-branch with the normaliser is deterministic for the same input, so the dry run's numbers are the run's numbers rather than an estimate of them. Pushing the removal to origin/mantra is the user's step and is recorded as still open. Phase 2 landed a5ff2641 and 3008137e as |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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d957ee8de5 |
feat(identity): a seed's key is a credential, and the seed is the wallet attached to it
Phase 1 of docs/multiple-profiles.md. No library change: the file format, the encrypted writer and the manager all exist, and the app already wrote the credentials file from the seed writer -- to delete a public entry a seed superseded. This changes what it writes there, and what the listing believes. Until now a seed's nostr key was never in nostr-credentials.dat. It was derived from the words at listing, to know which npub to show, and from the running node at activation, to know which key to sign with -- so a seed-backed profile existed only as a derivation, and the app had to start a Lightning node to find out who it was. Both sign-in plans made "one key, one file" an invariant, and it was the wrong one: it said a wallet is a profile. Now the credentials file is the list of profiles and a seed is a wallet attached to the entry its key derives. writeMnemonic writes two things, credential first: a Secret for the derived key under its x-only pubkey, replacing a public entry where there is one, and then the seed. Credential first because a crash between the two leaves a bare-key profile the phrase completes, which is a valid thing to hold and says the model out loud -- the profile exists, then a wallet is attached to it. The one refusal it drops is the phrase of a key held as a bare secret, SeedAlreadyExists under the nsec plan: the device did not have that wallet, so this is the profile acquiring the wallet that derives it. The entry stays a secret for the same key, the id becomes the wallet's, and the bare key's preference files go with the old id -- the profile's preferences are the wallet's now, fresh, which is right since there is a new secret to back up. The same seed twice is still refused, by wallet id, and is the only way a profile with a wallet attached is offered its phrase again. SeedCredentials.reconcile is the repair for every seed already on a device, beside migrateFromNostrKeys in listIdentities and shaped like it: a named, idempotent write, one file write for however many seeds are missing, nothing at all on a device with none or one already repaired. A failed write is a result, not a throw, and carries the map that was read: the listing goes on with it and merge derives the key of a seed that has no credential, so a seed this could not repair is still listed. A failed write must never hide a wallet. The plan had the repair running before the credentials file was read; it runs after, and hands the listing what it returns, so the file is decrypted once -- the doc now says so. StoredIdentity.merge inverts: the credentials are the list, and each seed is attached to the Secret its key derives -- listed once, as Mnemonic under the wallet's id, carrying the credential's key -- where before the seeds were the list and a secret for a seed's key was listed twice under two ids. Mnemonic gains privateKey. A Public for a seed's key is skipped with a log line, since the next repair upgrades it; a seed with no credential is listed by derivation, with a log line. IdentityKind.Mnemonic's doc changes to what the kind now means: the name records the attachment, not the source. setActiveWallet takes the StoredIdentity.Mnemonic and builds the identity from the credential's key, with the node's derivation as a cross-check -- a check(), because a node disagreeing with the credentials file is the one corruption worth refusing to run under, and it cannot fail for a file the repair wrote. The node still starts for a profile with a wallet attached: not for the key any more, but for what startNewBusiness does besides -- metadata, preferences, last-used build, and on Android the channel watcher a restored Phoenix phrase may need. Making it lazy is now one branch and is named as its own decision. forgetNostrCredential refuses a second thing: a key a seed derives. The seed would derive it again and the next repair would write it back, so a forget that succeeded would undo itself. NotACredential becomes WalletAttached in the writer's result and ForgetIdentity's outcome, since that is now the only reason a signing profile cannot be forgotten -- a key not in the file at all can, since the repair, only be a seed's key the repair could not write. The two sign-in docs' tables each gain a row pointing here for the invariant this supersedes. Tests: SeedCredentialsJvmTest against a device from before -- seed.dat written directly, no credentials -- writes exactly what is missing in one write; a device already repaired is not written to again, checked by the file's bytes since a rewrite would carry a fresh iv; a public entry for a seed's key is upgraded; bare keys are untouched; and a write that fails, with the key store locked, is reported with the map that was read and the wallet is still listed. IdentityWriterJvmTest drives the callback-shaped seed writer through a CompletableDeferred on a real Main dispatcher, since it reports after a real one-second delay: a phrase writes both files, its nsec and npub are then duplicates and its forget is WalletAttached; the same phrase twice is refused; the phrase of a bare key attaches, under the wallet's id, with the bare key's preferences gone; the phrase of a key held read-only attaches and the entry becomes a secret. StoredIdentityJvmTest lists a secret-plus-seed once with the credential's key, a seed without a credential by derivation, and a public entry for a seed's key as the wallet only. Not under test: the activation's cross-check, because a PhoenixBusiness cannot be built without a node. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@3008137e3f |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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44324c902b |
docs: plan several profiles on a device, starting from what a profile is
The switch already exists as a state transition -- switchToWallet, resetToSelector, a null identity sent to startup with popUpTo(0), every collector a child of collectLatest -- and is reachable from nowhere: Landing shows only when the device holds no identity, so a second can never be added, and the profile tab's "change account" is a pending route. This plan builds the two entrances and fixes what the transition gets wrong. Before either, it changes one rule the two sign-in plans share. A seed's nostr key is not written to the credentials file; it is derived from the words at listing and from the running node at activation, and the writers keep one key out of two files. That puts the wallet where the profile should be: the list is a merge of two files with opposite ideas of what a row is, and the node has to run for a profile to know its own key. Phase 1 makes a profile a credential and a seed a wallet attached to one -- the credential written when the seed is, repaired into the file for every seed already on the device, merge inverted to list credentials and attach seeds by pubkey, the identity's key read from the credential with the node's as a cross-check, and a second refusal on forget for a key a seed derives. The node still starts for a profile with a wallet attached, for the channel watcher rather than for the key; making it lazy is now one branch and is named as its own decision. The other decision is that a switch is a restart of the signed-in graph, not a swap under it: every route carries the key it was pushed for. That settles the switcher as a pushed screen behind one tap, the previous node stopped, the last-used profile as the one that opens on launch, and a profile added from inside switched to. Nine phases: the credential; the switch, with the relay observer that never cancelled its predecessor and the node that kept running; the startup precedence, which put "show me the list" above "open this one" and never saved a default; the switcher, showing the nostr profile rather than "Default name" and labelling a row with a wallet attached; the add rows, where a profile created from inside is a bare key and not a second wallet, and "end this" -- which wipes every profile's database -- goes; an owner on the two fetch queues and an inbox sweep on activation, because a gift wrap fetched under the other profile's key is stored and never opened again; the exits; a round trip; rollout, with the one downgrade that lists a seed's profile twice. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@a5ff264164 |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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5f2414dcb5 |
docs: plan the second pull from the fork, with its dry run already done
The upstream moved the day the first pull landed: ten commits on curated/curated, 86cb876b..29027f2b, that let a device hold several profiles and move between them, and with them the fork's first schema migration, version 20. The first plan named them the next pull and said the schema change earned a decision of its own. This is that plan, and unlike the first it was written after the dry run rather than before it, so its numbers are measured: rewrite from the fork point in 103 s, ten commits replayed onto |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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776455ecb0 |
refactor(groups): take out the group's nostr identity and the curated lists, and keep broadcast unreachable
Lines B, D and H of docs/curated-to-mantra.md, pulled from the Curated fork this
morning, go again this afternoon: the group's nostr profile (kind 0), its four relay
lists (NIP-65, NIP-17, NIP-50, NIP-51), its posts (kind 1), the curated schemas it
publishes (31889), the suggestions it reads (31888) and the entries it accepts
(31890). Eighty-two files, twelve screens, the `nostr/curated/` package, the readings
(`GroupNostrProfile`, `GroupRelayList`, `GroupPost`, `GroupCuratedSchema`,
`GroupCuratedEntry`, `CuratedSuggestion`), the `applyInnerEvent` arms for all eight
kinds, the `ChatRepository` and `NostrRepository` reads that fed them, 226 strings,
and every test that came with them. A translation collective has no list to curate
and no reason to describe itself under a key no member controls, and five rows
saying so on every group's screen were five rows about somebody else's product.
**The pasted-event proposal goes with them, because it was theirs.**
`GroupEventProposal.ACCEPTED_KINDS` was exactly kinds 0, 1, the four relay-list
kinds and 31889 -- "the kinds the group's screen has a place for", in its own words --
so with the five rows gone it would have refused every paste. Keeping it as a
generic "sign any event" was considered and rejected: the screen's whole argument
was that a member goes to the row to see the event landed, and there is no row. The
`ProposedEvent` summaries for the same kinds go too; the one test of its pre-existing
fallback ("Event of kind N") is kept, as the only line of `ProposedEventTest` that
was about code this repository had before the pull.
**Broadcast stays, and nothing opens it.** `BroadcastGroupSignedEventScreen`, its
route, view model, state and `BroadcastButton` are kept, on the decision that a way
to send a group-signed event to relays is worth having against the day something
wires a button in -- the button's only call sites were the five removed screens.
Two things had to change for it to compile against a tree with no relay lists:
`defaultRelaysFor(kind)` is now the app's own publish set for every kind, since the
General list it preferred, the Blocked list it filtered by and the schema relays it
widened to no longer exist; and `relayUrlOrNull` moves into the view model's
companion from the deleted `GroupRelaySet`, unchanged. The hint on the screen says
"the relays this app publishes to" rather than "where the group has said it lives".
Its two tests are rewritten around the new seed: the screen test answers for the
first two seeded relays and counts the rest as asked, and empties the list by hand
to see the empty state, since the seed always has something in it. Deleting
broadcast outright -- the tidier tree -- was the recommendation and was declined.
**Every pre-existing file is back at its pre-pull content plus the kept lines'
hunks, and nothing else.** Eleven files -- `ChatMessage.kt`, `NostrEventDao.kt`,
`NostrEvent.kt`, `LocalChatRoom.kt`, `Member.kt`, `ProposedEvent.kt`,
`ChatTranscript.kt`, `ProfileAvatar.kt`, the group screen's view model and state,
and `m3-title-case.py` -- were touched by no kept commit and are restored from
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Kgothatso Ngako
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0fa807a6fb |
docs: record what the pull built, and the seven places it chose differently
Phases 0 to 5 of docs/curated-to-mantra.md are landed on this branch: thirty
commits pulled from curated/curated, each carrying a `Pulled-From` trailer
naming the commit it came from, on top of Phase 0's two native ones. The plan
is kept as written and its status line now says what happened, with the table
the house keeps for a plan that has been built -- what it said against what
it turned out to be -- and the README's sentence about it follows.
**Seven differences, and none of them are corrections to the plan's
decisions.** The three decisions -- drop the brand line but keep its
reasoning, keep Mantra's sections by dropping 808a3459, take the curated
lists -- all held, and the measured predictions about them (the screen's
order, the tests, the audit) came true to the number. What changed was
mechanics: the phased replay is a cherry-pick per commit rather than a rebase
of each cut, because a recreated merge cannot reach a parent that was replayed
in an earlier phase; the library pin follows the commit rather than staying
put, because the compiler said the nsec line does not build against 84cc44c;
the join files are taken from upstream's own merges rather than unioned, for
three reasons that each took a failed attempt to learn; and the exactness
residual is seventeen files rather than sixteen plus a logo, because Mantra's
own side had moved too. Each is written in the table with the reasoning
beside it, so the next pull starts from what happened.
**The numbers are per phase, so a regression later can be placed.** jvmTest
736, 864, 905, 1,007, 1,039 and testDebugUnitTest 403, 486, 495, 530, 530
across Phases 0 to 5; both compilers clean and every m3 audit budget met at
each; the final jvmTest executed rather than restored from the build cache,
1,039 tests in 46 seconds of test time, 0 failures. The plan's own dry run
predicted 1,036; the three extra are 39fb64b6's pin of the library's
nostrPublicKey() against NIP-06.
**What is not done is named rather than implied.** Phase 6's two reverse-pulls
--
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Kgothatso Ngako
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1c59ed34d7 |
chore(library): track the submodule's default branch
.gitmodules names master as the branch lightning-kmp-app tracks, so that `git submodule update --remote` follows the library's default branch rather than whatever this git's fallback happens to be. The pinned commit is unchanged: the app still builds against 84cc44c on claude/nostr-credentials, one commit ahead of master, until that commit is merged and the pointer moved to master's tip -- which is what tracking master says should happen. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Pulled-From: curated/curated@3116eb8a8c |