395bfa6b8b1c8b4516a540b975e01c2d70ca0c4f
3
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5
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65e4a3acc0 |
fix: seal the Welcome, the one gift wrap an MLS room must publish
No invite to a Marmot room has been delivered since |
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Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5
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c24cbed390 |
docs: record what the coverage work found, and what it left uncovered
Three additions. The decision the inbound path makes now has a name and a home -- MarmotDirectMessage.classify -- and the doc says why it is separate from the filing of it: only the filing needs a database, so splitting them is what lets the check that replaces MIP-03 be tested at all. A security property found while writing those tests, which I had asserted backwards. Relabelling a seal with another member's pubkey does not get as far as the signature check: NIP-44 derives the conversation key from the pubkey being claimed, so a relabelled seal is undecryptable by the person it was encrypted for. The label is bound to the key rather than asserted alongside it, and the outcome is a message the recipient genuinely cannot read. verify() catches the narrower case of a seal altered after signing in a way that survives decryption. An honest list of what has no automated test and why -- the recipient validation and the outbound id lookup (both need a database), the two transcript renderings (no Compose UI test dependency in this project), and anything touching a real MlsGroup. Better written down than rediscovered by someone assuming a green suite means the path is covered. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5
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635cef9311 |
docs: write down how a direct message travels, and what it costs
The reasoning behind this is not recoverable from the code, which is the bar docs/README.md sets for having a document at all. Three things in particular would otherwise have to be rediscovered by whoever changes this next, and two of them are traps. Why the wrap uses a throwaway key rather than the sender's own -- and what that does not buy. It does not hide the sender from the group: MLS authenticates every application message to a leaf, so the identity is there regardless. What it costs is a carve-out in MIP-03's pubkey check and the sender's ability to ever read their own messages back. Why the check that carve-out removes is not a hole. The authorship claim moves from the wrap's plaintext pubkey to the seal's verified signature, bound to the MLS leaf that sent it -- strictly harder to forge than what it replaced. The one query that would broadcast one of these. What this builds is a genuine, correctly signed NIP-59 gift wrap, indistinguishable from what the NIP-17 path would be right to publish, and the only thing keeping it off a relay is that it never becomes a GiftWrapPayload. Written against what shipped rather than what was planned, so it records two deviations. senderIdentity is resolved in NostrDao rather than added to GroupEventResult.ApplicationMessage, because quartz is a binary dependency here and the local checkout is a reference copy, not a build input. And a failed validation drops the message and logs rather than throwing, because the caller is inside storeNostrEvent's transaction. The unbuilt parts are listed as absences rather than left implied: there is no member picker, so a private message can only be a reply to one somebody already sent, and nothing in the UI yet tells a user in words that the group can see who they messaged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |